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Mudd: Coalbed Methane Development

MONTANA V. WYOMING:
AN OPPORTUNITY TO RIGHT
THE COURSE FOR COALBED
METHANE DEVELOPMENT
AND PRIOR APPROPRIATION
MICHELLE BRYAN MUDD *

I.

INTRODUCTION

Across vast swathes of western lands, coalbed methane (CBM)
wells dot the landscape, pumping out billions of gallons of groundwater
to release natural gases trapped within subterranean coal seams. 1 These
coal seams interlace complex networks of underground aquifers, many of
which share a relationship with overlying surface waters. In Wyoming,
Montana, and other western states, these CBM wells are developed
largely outside of the traditional prior appropriation system, with little or
no review of how water rights may be affected. These CBM wells are
also developed under state laws that give little consideration to the

* Associate Professor and Director of the Land Use Clinic, University of Montana School of Law. I
dedicate this Article to the peoples of Montana and Wyoming—two great states that I have had the
opportunity to call home—whose hard work and love of place have inspired my own endeavors. My
thanks to research assistants Nicholas Gochis and Andrew Gorder for their valuable assistance. This
piece benefitted from the careful editing of my colleague Bari Burke and the insights of attorneys
DarAnne Dunning and Jack Tuholske. My thanks as well to Bill Woessner, Professor of
Geohydrology, for his guidance on matters of science.
1
For technical background on CBM production, see NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, MANAGEMENT AND EFFECTS OF COALBED METHANE
PRODUCED WATER IN THE UNITED STATES 11–12, 19–24 (2010) [hereinafter COALBED METHANE
PRODUCED WATER], available at www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12915; GARY BRYNER,
COALBED METHANE DEVELOPMENT IN THE INTERMOUNTAIN WEST: PRIMER 5–7, 13–16 (July 2002)
[hereinafter CBM PRIMER], available at www.colorado.edu/law/centers/nrlc/publications/
CBM_Primer.pdf.
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interstate nature of the affected waters. 2 Commentators have called for a
more cohesive CBM regulatory regime that protects water rights users,
and the law has experienced incremental changes. But change has been
slow, and the present reality is that western states are enabling CBM
development without a true understanding of how CBM groundwater
withdrawals impact both underground and surface water supplies. With
tremendous pressures to develop CBM as a principal fuel source, 3 and
technical complexities that obscure our understanding of the CBM-water
relationship, the problem appears intractable, yet deeply in need of
reform.
Herein lies the significance of the current United States Supreme
Court litigation between Montana and Wyoming. 4 The case centers upon
the interstate waters of the Powder River Basin (the Basin), home to one
of the largest and fastest developing CBM reserves in the nation. 5 The
Basin, nestled within the Yellowstone River system, contains an
estimated 18,000 CBM wells collectively pumping somewhere between
30 and 110 billion gallons of water each year, predominantly on the
Wyoming side. 6 Among its several allegations in Montana v. Wyoming,
Montana alleges that Wyoming’s substantial CBM withdrawals are
depleting surface waters that belong to Montana under the 1950
Yellowstone River Compact (the Compact). 7
Some sixty years ago, when the Compact’s negotiators were
2

See COALBED METHANE PRODUCED WATER, supra note 1, at 20 fig.2.1 (depicting several
major coalbed methane basins that straddle state lines in Montana, Wyoming, Utah, Colorado, and
New Mexico); see also CBM PRIMER, supra note 1, at 7–8 figs.5, 6.
3
COALBED METHANE PRODUCED WATER, supra note 1, at 13 (“Natural gas has been
described as a principal transition fuel to a less carbon-intensive U.S. energy portfolio.”); CBM
PRIMER, supra note 1, at 1 (describing CBM as “one of the most important and valuable natural
resources” and “a central element of the national goal of a secure supply of energy”); see also CBM
PRIMER, supra note 1, at 13 fig.9 (setting out CBM development revenues earned by state and local
governments).
4
See Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765 (2011) (No. 137, Orig.) (Opinion on Exception
to Report of Special Master). All of the litigation documents referenced in this Article are located
online at: www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/22o137.htm (U.S. Supreme
Court docket) and www.stanford.edu/dept/law/mvn/ (Special Master docket).
5
See COALBED METHANE PRODUCED WATER, supra note 1, at 15 fig.1.4; see also CBM
PRIMER, supra note 1, at 1, 8. The Powder River Basin includes the Tongue and Powder Rivers.
6
Estimates vary. See COALBED METHANE PRODUCED WATER, supra note 1, at 34 tbl.2.1
(citing a 30 billion gallon figure based on 2008 data provided by the State of Wyoming); see also
CBM Primer, supra note 1, at 15 (supporting a 100 billion gallon figure based on estimates of
average CBM well flows in the Basin being between 12–15 gallons per minute, which roughly
translates to 17,000–21,000 gallons per day, multiplied over 18,000 wells). Additional monthly
calculations on the Wyoming side are provided in note 74, infra.
7
See Montana’s Bill of Complaint ¶ 11, Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765 (2011) (No.
137, Orig.). The official citation for the Compact is YELLOWSTONE RIVER COMPACT, Pub. L. No.
82-231, 65 Stat. 663 (1951) [hereinafter YELLOWSTONE RIVER COMPACT].
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dividing the interstate waters of the Yellowstone River system, they had
little inkling that CBM development would later transform the landscape
of the Powder River Basin. Their focus was instead on the paramount
importance of irrigated agriculture to the survival of the arid region.
Arriving at what they believed to be an equitable division of waters, the
States of Wyoming, Montana, and North Dakota expressly adopted the
doctrine of prior appropriation to govern the uses of water under the
Compact. 8 The Montana v. Wyoming litigation thus confronts the same
issue with which the western states are grappling: Can CBM
development regulations be made consistent with traditional prior
appropriation principles?
The U.S. Supreme Court recently issued its first ruling in Montana
v. Wyoming, 9 addressing the separate question of whether the prior
appropriation doctrine accommodates Wyoming irrigators who upgrade
their irrigation efficiencies and reduce historic return flows to Montana. 10
While the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on Montana’s CBM claim, its
appointed Special Master 11 Barton H. Thompson has issued some
threshold legal conclusions. Importantly, he has concluded that
groundwater withdrawals are within the scope of the Compact and that
Wyoming would be in violation of the Compact if it is allowing CBM
groundwater withdrawals to deplete surface waters belonging to
Montana. 12 The Special Master’s conclusions, which Wyoming chose
not to appeal, 13 create significant repercussions for Wyoming CBM
8

These Compact provisions are discussed in Part I.A, infra.
See Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765 (2011) (No. 137, Orig.) (Opinion on Exception
to Report of Special Master).
10
For a discussion of this ruling, see the companion article, Lawrence J. MacDonnell,
Montana v. Wyoming: Sprinklers, Irrigation Water Use Efficiency, and the Doctrine of Recapture, 5
GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 265 (2012).
11
See Order Appointing Barton H. Thompson, Esquire, of Stanford California, as Special
Master, Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765 (2011) (No. 137, Orig.) [hereinafter Order
Appointing Barton H. Thompson]. For a discussion of the role of Special Masters in original U.S.
Supreme Court proceedings, see generally Anne-Marie C. Carstens, Lurking in the Shadows of
Judicial Process: Special Masters in the Supreme Court's Original Jurisdiction Cases, 86 MINN. L.
REV. 625 (2002).
12
See First Interim Report of the Special Master at 89–90, Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct.
1765 (2011) (No. 137, Orig.) [hereinafter First Interim Report]. Because this conclusion was reached
in ruling on Wyoming’s Motion to Dismiss, the Special Master has decided only the legal question
of whether such activities would constitute an actionable violation of the Compact. The question of
whether actual violations are occurring may be resolved only after discovery and further fact finding
proceedings in the case. Id.
13
Because Wyoming did not challenge these conclusions by the Court’s deadline for filing
exceptions, it is assumed that the issue is finally resolved and has become the law of the case. As a
procedural formality, however, the Court likely must still adopt the Special Master’s conclusion. See
Carstens, supra note 11, at 656 (“[W]hile the Special Master's reports and recommendations are
advisory only, the Court usually enters the Master's recommendation as its order if neither of the
9
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development, and arguably Montana CBM development as well. The
Special Master will next consider whether Wyoming’s CBM
groundwater pumping is indeed depleting surface water supplies, and if
so, what remedies are appropriate to address the Compact violations. 14
These remaining questions create an important opportunity to usher in
regulatory changes that ensure CBM development does not undermine
the Compact’s division of waters—regulatory changes that may serve as
a signpost for the other western states as well.
Part I of this Article provides a brief background on the
Yellowstone River Compact and the Montana v. Wyoming litigation.
This part further explains the Special Master’s analysis of the CBM
issue, as well as the Supreme Court’s recent ruling on improved
irrigation efficiency. When viewed together, these decisions provide an
important framework for determining how the parties’ regulation of
CBM development should proceed. Part II then describes the magnitude
of the CBM groundwater pumping issue and asserts that the posture of
the Montana v. Wyoming case provides a unique opportunity not only to
set Powder River Basin CBM development on the right course for
Compact compliance, but also to more broadly right the course for how
prior appropriation and CBM development work together in the western
states. If this opportunity is not seized, there is great potential for harm to
water users throughout the West, some of which may be irreversible and
may not be redressed under current state laws. Focusing on the remedy
aspect of the litigation, Part III then discusses the steps that the Special
Master—or the parties in a settlement process—can take to design a
comprehensive CBM regulatory process that upholds the principles of
prior appropriation. These steps include invalidating those aspects of the
States’ current CBM regulations that fail to comply with the Compact
and requiring new, science-based regulatory features that prospectively
protect water rights users.
The Article concludes that the Yellowstone River Compact dispute,
and like disputes throughout the West, cannot be fully resolved without a
new regulatory process for CBM development that prospectively
addresses harms to water rights. Ultimately, this interstate dispute
provides a rare and critical lens for all prior appropriation states

state parties file a formal objection.”).
14
While a possibility exists that the Special Master may ultimately find there is no surface
water depletion from CBM groundwater pumping, the available hydrogeologic data suggests
otherwise. See discussion in Parts II and III.B, infra. To the extent the evidence is inconclusive, this
Article argues that the Special Master should order further studies and monitoring as part of the
remedy in the case, taking a precautionary approach to avoid irreversible harms to the water supply.
See discussion in Part III, infra.
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grappling with how to adapt traditional appropriative rights principles to
the emerging use of CBM development.
II.

TAKING GUIDANCE FROM THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND SPECIAL
MASTER RULINGS IN THE CASE

In 2007 the U.S. Supreme Court accepted original jurisdiction in
Montana v. Wyoming to resolve allegations that Montana has made
against Wyoming under the 1950 Yellowstone River Compact, an
agreement that covers the interstate waters of the Powder River Basin,
including the Tongue and Powder Rivers at issue in the litigation. 15 As is
the tradition in interstate water disputes, the Supreme Court appointed a
Special Master—in this case noted water law Professor Barton H.
Thompson, Jr.—to hear evidence and make recommended rulings to the
Supreme Court. 16
Montana alleges that Wyoming is allowing several types of water
uses, including CBM groundwater pumping, 17 that have resulted in the
illegal taking of water belonging to Montana under the Compact. 18 To
support its allegations, Montana points to data on the Tongue and
Powder Rivers showing declines in the amount of water that has
historically crossed into Montana. 19 While the Special Master has
addressed several aspects of Montana’s claims, 20 the Supreme Court has
ruled on only one claim thus far―that Wyoming has illegally “allowed
the consumption of water on existing irrigated acreage . . . to be
increased” through the use of upgrades in irrigation efficiency, thereby
15

Although the State of North Dakota is also a signatory of the Compact and is thus named
in the litigation, Montana has not made claims against North Dakota. Montana’s Brief in Support of
Motion for Leave to File Bill of Complaint at 3, Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765 (2011) (No.
137, Orig.) [hereinafter Montana’s Brief in Support]. The Powder River Basin, which contains the
Powder and Tongue Rivers, is a subbasin nested within the Yellowstone River Basin. See Water
Resources Division, Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation, Yellowstone
River Basin Map, dnrc.mt.gov/wrd/water_mgmt/water_reservations/yellowstone_riv_basin/
yrb_reliefmap.asp (last visited Mar. 12, 2012). For a fuller discussion of the background of the
Montana v. Wyoming case and the Yellowstone River Compact, see Melosa Granda, A Water Story
With Original Jurisdiction, and a Doctrine for Changing Uses, 5 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 257
(2012); see also First Interim Report, supra note 12, at 1–12.
16
See Order Appointing Barton H. Thompson, supra note 11.
17
Other allegations not addressed in this Article include the illegal expansion of irrigated
acreage, illegal permitting of groundwater wells for irrigation and other uses, and illegal enlargement
or new construction of water storage facilities. See Bill of Complaint, supra note 7, ¶¶ 9–11.
18
See generally Bill of Complaint, supra note 7.
19
See generally Joint Appendix 0317-0498, Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765 (2011)
(No. 137, Orig.) (containing annual reports to the Yellowstone River Compact Commission that
comparatively show a decline in water supply to Montana).
20
See generally First Interim Report, supra note 12.
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diminishing return flows available to Montana (the “improved irrigation
efficiency” allegation). 21 In his First Interim Report, the Special Master
concluded that Wyoming irrigators can upgrade their irrigation
efficiency without violating the Compact, so long as they are using the
conserved water to irrigate lands already under irrigation. 22 Montana
filed an exception to this conclusion, 23 and the Supreme Court affirmed
the Special Master in its Opinion on Exception to Report of Special
Master. 24
More favorably for Montana, the Special Master also concluded that
the Compact, which is silent concerning groundwater, nonetheless covers
groundwater hydrologically connected to surface water in the Basin;
further, that Wyoming CBM groundwater pumping violates the Compact
if it takes surface water away from Montana water users. 25 Wyoming did
not file an exception to this conclusion, so the issue did not reach the
Supreme Court for oral argument. 26 Remaining before the Special Master
are questions of whether Wyoming’s CBM development is depleting
Montana’s surface water supplies and, if so, what remedies are
appropriate to address these violations. 27
The Supreme Court’s Opinion on Exception to Report of Special
Master provides important guidance on how Wyoming’s CBM
groundwater withdrawals should be analyzed under the Compact.
Notably, the Supreme Court has concluded that the Compact is subject to
the doctrine of prior appropriation, as defined through a comparative
analysis of the water laws of the western states. If a similar analysis is
applied to the CBM groundwater issue, it is likely Wyoming’s conduct
will be found to violate the no-waste and no-injury rules of prior
appropriation.

21

See Bill of Complaint, supra note 7, ¶ 12; see also Montana’s Exception and Brief at 7–8,
Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765 (2011) (No. 137, Orig.); Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct.
1765, 1170 n.1 (2011) (No. 137, Orig.) (Opinion on Exception to Report of Special Master).
22
See First Interim Report, supra note 12, at 86-88.
23
See Montana’s Exception and Brief, supra note 21, at 21–25.
24
See Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765, 1769 (2011) (No. 137, Orig.) (Opinion on
Exception to Report of Special Master).
25
See First Interim Report, supra note 12, at 89–90.
26
For a discussion on the likely procedural posture of this issue, see supra note 12.
27
See id., at 2.
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THE SUPREME COURT’S CONCLUSION THAT THE LAWS OF PRIOR
APPROPRIATION IMBUE THE COMPACT

The operative language of the Yellowstone River Compact begins
in Article V(A):
Appropriative rights to the beneficial uses of the water of the
Yellowstone River System existing in each signatory State as of
January 1, 1950, shall continue to be enjoyed in accordance with the
laws governing the acquisition and use of water under the doctrine of
appropriation. 28

Article V(B) of the Compact then proceeds to describe how the
States will apportion the unused and unappropriated waters after January
1, 1950, for either (1) supplemental water supplies on existing irrigated
lands or (2) water storage or direct diversions for beneficial uses on new
lands. 29 These supplemental appropriations are also “to be acquired and
enjoyed in accordance with the laws governing the acquisition and use of
water under the doctrine of appropriation.” 30
The Compact waters are thus divided between existing pre-1950
water rights and water uses developed after 1950. Whereas Montana’s
improved irrigation efficiency allegation targeted Wyoming’s misuse of
pre-1950 water rights, Montana’s CBM groundwater pumping allegation
targets Wyoming’s misuse of water that was developed after the
Compact was ratified. Nonetheless, as argued below, the Compact
subjects both pre- and post-1950 waters to prior appropriation
principles. 31
The Compact also defines key terms used in Article V, including:
Beneficial Use: “[T]hat use by which the water supply of a drainage
basin is depleted when usefully employed by the activities of man.”
Divert and Diversion: “[T]he taking or removing of water from the
Yellowstone River or any tributary thereof when the water so taken or
removed is not returned directly into the channel of the Yellowstone
River or of the tributary from which it is taken.”
Yellowstone River System: “[T]he Yellowstone River and all of its
tributaries, including springs and swamps, from their sources to the
28

See YELLOWSTONE RIVER COMPACT, supra note 7.
Id. art. V(B).
30
Id.
31
See discussion infra Part III.A.
29
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mouth of the Yellowstone River . . . .”
Tributary: “[A]ny stream which in a natural state contributes to the
flow of the Yellowstone River, including interstate tributaries and
tributaries thereof . . . .” 32

Also important is the Compact’s statement that the parties intend to
“provide for an equitable division and apportionment” of the waters in
the Yellowstone River System and “to remove all causes of present and
future controversy” concerning those waters. 33
The Compact provisions between Montana and Wyoming are
administered by the Yellowstone River Compact Commission (Compact
Commission), comprised of one Montana representative, one Wyoming
representative, and one representative from the federal government. 34
Although there is a dispute resolution process involving the Compact
Commission, that body was unable to resolve the existing dispute
between the States because it deadlocked in a 1:1 vote, with the U.S.
representative abstaining. 35 This gridlock evidences the parties’ inability
to negotiate a settlement of their differences.
In its Opinion on Exception to Report of Special Master, the
Supreme Court—in a 7:1 decision 36 —began with the general proposition
that “[a]s with all contracts, we interpret the compact according to the
intent of the parties, here the signatory States.” 37 The Supreme Court
then held that Article V(A) of the Compact directly incorporates the
doctrine of prior appropriation. 38 Therefore, even though the parties are
subject to the negotiated terms of the Compact, there are nonetheless
common law water principles that will be read into the document. Next,
the Supreme Court proceeded to consult case law from prior
appropriation states and treatises summarizing appropriative rights
principles. 39 This approach makes sense from the perspective of
understanding what the intent of the signatory States was when they used
32

See YELLOWSTONE RIVER COMPACT, supra note 7, arts. II(D), (E), (G) and (H).
Id. pmbl.
34
Id. art. III.
35
See Montana’s Brief in Support, supra note 15, at 26-27 (“Montana brings its claims after
many years of attempting to resolve fundamental differences with Wyoming on matters of Compact
interpretation. In the absence of a resolution by agreement between the States, only this Court can
resolve the dispute. . . . [T]he states are deadlocked over threshold legal questions regarding the
proper interpretation of the Compact.”).
36
Justice Scalia dissented and Justice Kagan did not participate. Montana v. Wyoming, 131
S. Ct. 1765, 1779 (2011) (No. 137, Orig.) (Opinion on Exception to Report of Special Master).
37
Id. at 1771–72 n.4.
38
Id. at 1772.
39
Id. at 1772–77.
33
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the phrase “doctrine of appropriation.”
There are, however, difficulties attendant with incorporating
common law principles into a compact. Foremost among them is the
reality that common law, including water law, is by its very nature an
evolving universe of norms. It is not entirely clear whether the parties
intended to incorporate the common law at the time of the Compact or
the evolving principles of common law over time. The Supreme Court
noted this dilemma in its Opinion on Exception to Report of Special
Master:
The States appear to have assumed that the doctrine has not changed
in a way directly relevant here. We therefore do not decide whether
Article V(A) intended to freeze appropriation law as it stood in 1949,
or whether it incorporates the evolution of the doctrine over time,
allowing Compact-protected rights to grow or shrink accordingly. We
resolve the first exception without prejudice to that issue. 40

For purposes of the first exception, then, the Supreme Court, like
the Special Master before it, examined both pre- and post-1950 water law
on the issue of improved irrigation efficiency. 41
Also problematic is the question of which state’s common law
should govern. Although scholars can derive some common
appropriative rights principles among the prior appropriation states, 42 the
reality is that no two states apply those principles in precisely the same
way. Because Montana and Wyoming are the litigating parties, the
Supreme Court began by looking at the prior appropriation laws within
Wyoming and Montana, and from there enlarged its inquiry to the
broader universe of western states that follow prior appropriation. 43 The
Supreme Court also noted instances when one appropriation state took a
unique, and therefore unrepresentative, position on an issue. 44
Finally, and perhaps most problematic, is the question of how to
craft prior appropriation law for issues on which little or no law exists.
This task places the Supreme Court in the difficult and reluctant position
of determining what it believes the laws of the States to be in the absence
40

Id. at 1771–72 n.4.
Id.
42
There are nine states classified as pure appropriation states and another ten considered to
espouse a hybrid of appropriation and riparian principles. See DAVID H. GETCHES, WATER LAW IN A
NUTSHELL 5–8 (4th ed. 2009); see also JOSEPH L. SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER
RESOURCES: CASE AND MATERIALS 12–13 fig.1-5 (4th ed. 2006). The Court focused its inquiry
almost exclusively on the pure appropriation states.
43
Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765, 1771–72 n.4 (2011).
44
Id. at 1775 n.8.
41
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of case law directly on point. Such was the case with the improved
irrigation efficiency issue, of which the Supreme Court observed that
“[t]he lack of clarity in this area of water law highlights the sensitive
nature of our inquiry and counsels caution.” 45 To resolve this dilemma,
the Supreme Court limited its holding to the Compact alone and stated
that its decision “is not intended to restrict the States’ determination of
their respective appropriation doctrines.” 46
Because there was no case on all fours, the Supreme Court looked
to general trends in change-of-use rules and recapture rules to conclude
that irrigation efficiency improvements “are within the original
appropriative right of Wyoming’s pre-1950 water users,” even when
return flows are diminished. 47 Particularly compelling to the Supreme
Court was the lack of water law scholars who have reached an alternative
opinion on the issue. 48
As the Special Master has acknowledged, “[w]hether groundwater
withdrawals in Wyoming can violate Article V(A) of the Compact is a
more difficult question . . . .” 49 Coalbed methane development is a
relatively recent phenomenon that hit the Powder River Basin in the late
1990s, 50 some four decades after the Compact was entered. Coalbed
methane groundwater pumping is on such a scale and is sufficiently
distinct from other forms of mining water use as to require an adaptation
in traditional water law norms. To date, the appropriation states have
largely avoided the question of how to bring CBM development into
compliance with state water laws, opting instead to create loopholes and
exemptions for CBM. In response, scholars have called for legal reforms
that better protect traditional water rights users―focusing primarily on
CBM’s violations of the no-waste and no-injury rules in prior
appropriation. 51 The Special Master has thus begun answering the
45

Id. at 1773 n.5.
Id. at 1773 n.5.
47
Id. at 1776.
48
Id. at 1777. In his dissent, Justice Scalia criticizes the majority’s “none-too-confident”
reading of the common law. Id. at 1779–80 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
49
First Interim Report, supra note 12, at 43.
50
ROMEO M. FLORES ET AL., U.S. DEPT. OF INTERIOR, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, OPENFILE REPORT 01-126 at 2 (2001), available at pubs.usgs.gov/of/2001/ofr-01-126/OF01-126.pdf.
51
While the articles on point are numerous, some recent representative pieces include Colby
Barrett, Fitting a Square Peg in a Round (Drill) Hole: The Evolving Legal Treatment of Coalbed
Methane-Produced Water in the Intermountain West, 38 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,661
(2008); Gary Bryner, Coalbed Methane Development in the Intermountain West: Producing Energy
and Protecting Water, 4 WYO. L. REV. 541 (2004); Cody Doig, Case Note, Vance v. Wolfe:
“Beneficial Use” or “Beneficial Byproduct”?—An Analysis of Produced Water in Colorado, 13 U.
DENV. WATER L. REV. 163 (2009); Arlene J. Kwasniak, Waste Not Want Not: A Comparative
Analysis and Critique of Legal Rights to Use and Re-Use Produced Water—Lessons for Alberta, 10
46
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difficult CBM questions by drawing on the parties’ stated intent in the
Compact, as well as developing legal norms and scholarship in western
water law.
B.

THE SPECIAL MASTER’S INCLUSION OF GROUNDWATER IN THE
COMPACT

As a threshold matter, Wyoming argued that the Compact does not
cover groundwater, but rather is limited to the surface waters in the
Yellowstone River Basin. 52 Its argument hinged on the absence of any
mention of groundwater in the Compact’s definitions of “Yellowstone
River System” and “Tributary” (set out above). Under Wyoming’s
reasoning, its water users would be allowed to pump whatever amounts
of groundwater they wished, even if that pumping depletes surface water
supplies in the Basin. Resolving this legal question in Montana’s favor,
the Special Master concluded that the Compact includes groundwater
that is hydrologically connected to surface waters in the Basin. Among
the highlights of the Special Master’s analysis are the following:
Evidence of the Parties’ Intent. The Special Master noted the
Compact’s statement that pre-1950 water rights “shall continue to be
enjoyed.” Since new groundwater withdrawals could “directly
interfere with the continued enjoyment of pre-1950 surface rights in
Montana,” the parties must have intended the Compact to be read
broadly enough to cover hydrologically connected groundwaters. 53

Other important statements of intent are the Compact’s twin goals to
“remove all causes of present and future controversy . . . with respect to
the waters of the Yellowstone River and its tributaries” and to “provide
for an equitable division and apportionment of such waters.” 54 Quoting
language from a Special Master’s Report in a prior compact case, the
Special Master concluded that:
Given the purposes of the Compact, “neither the parties to the
Compact, nor the Congress and the President who approved it, could
have intended that an upstream State could, with impunity, unilaterally
enlarge its allocation by taking some of the virgin water supply before

U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 357 (2007); Anne MacKinnon & Kate Fox, Demanding Beneficial Use:
Opportunities and Obligations for Wyoming Regulators in Coalbed Methane, 6 WYO. L. REV. 369
(2006).
52
Wyoming’s Motion to Dismiss at 59, Montana v. Wyoming, No. 137, Orig. (Apr. 1, 2008).
53
See First Interim Report, supra note 12, at 11, 44–45.
54
YELLOWSTONE RIVER COMPACT, supra note 7, pmbl., art. V(A).
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it reached the stream flow.” 55
Evidence of Appropriation Law at the Time of Compact. The parties’
intent to include hydrologically connected groundwater is
corroborated by the science and the state of water law at the time of
compacting. The Special Master observed that for “decades prior” the
appropriation doctrine recognized that groundwater directly connected
with a stream must be jointly managed with the surface waters to
56
ensure priority of water rights. Treatises, state court decisions,
scientific journals, and prior compact decisions by the Supreme Court
support this principle of connectivity. 57
Evidence of Appropriation Law Post-Compact. The Special Master
also observed the post-Compact developments in groundwater law,
noting that both Montana and Wyoming have since placed
groundwater within their respective permitting systems, subjecting the
waters to prior appropriation principles. 58 Based on all of these
evidentiary sources, the Special Master ultimately concluded that
Basin groundwater diverted out of priority with hydrologically
connected senior surface water rights would violate the Compact. 59

The Special Master reserved for future decision the issue of “exactly
what groundwater is covered” and “the question of the exact
circumstances under which groundwater pumping violates Article
V(A).” 60 These questions will necessarily involve discovery and
evidentiary proceedings. Further, questions remain as to whether the
Special Master’s conclusions on CBM groundwater use will be extended
to include post-1950 water rights under Article V(B). 61 Finally, the
Special Master has yet to recommend the type of remedy that would
55

First Interim Report, supra note 12, at 53 (citing First Report of the Special Master,
Kansas v. Nebraska, No. 126, Orig., at 21 (Jan. 28, 2000)).
56
See id., at 45.
57
See generally id. at 45–50.
58
Id. at 50–52.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 54, 90.
61
At this stage in the proceeding, the Special Master has reached a conclusion only as to
claims under Article V(A). Id. at 93 (addressing Montana’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the
question of whether the Compact applies to all tributaries of the Tongue and Powder Rivers).
Therefore, there is a lingering question about whether the same analysis would apply to diversions
and storage of waters affecting post-1950 water rights. On December 20, 2011, the Special Master
held that although Montana’s Bill of Complaint is broad enough to cover post-1950 claims, it must
seek leave to amend its Complaint to more clearly articulate those claims under the Compact. See
generally Memorandum Opinion of the Special Master on Montana’s Claims Under Article V(B),
Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765 (2011) (No. 137, Orig.) [hereinafter Opinion on Article V(B)
Claims].
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redress injuries and prospectively ensure that CBM groundwater
withdrawals do not take waters belonging to water users under the
Compact.
Viewing the Supreme Court’s ruling and the Special Master’s
conclusions together, a framework emerges for how to resolve the
remaining CBM issues in the case. As argued in Part III, the Special
Master should include post-1950 water rights in his recommendations to
ensure a complete resolution of the CBM controversy between the States.
The Special Master should also note where Wyoming’s CBM regulations
fail to follow prior appropriation principles and jeopardize the continued
enjoyment of water rights protected by the Compact. Noting the
deficiencies in Montana’s CBM regulations is important as well because
Montana water users should be equally protected from CBM
groundwater depletions on the Montana side of the Basin. 62 Finally, the
Special Master should require a science-informed analysis of injury to
water users, along with ongoing monitoring and management, as part of
the CBM well permitting process in both States.
These recommended steps are important for several reasons.
Foremost, leaving these issues unresolved will lead to the inevitable
return of the parties to the U.S. Supreme Court for further lengthy
proceedings. Coalbed methane development is occurring at a
breathtaking pace and there is no evidence that the States, on their own,
will legislatively address the deficiencies in their CBM regulations. Nor
do the parties’ recent breakdowns in negotiations provide assurance of a
compromised settlement. Additionally, because of the sheer magnitude
of groundwater pumping involved, time is of the essence. The longer the
States turn a blind eye to the harms caused by CBM development, the
greater the risk that water users will be injured and that irreversible
depletions will occur to the Basin’s water resources. Finally, by
addressing how CBM groundwater production fits within the prior
appropriation systems of Montana and Wyoming, the Special Master and
the parties are in the unique position of creating a successful process that
other western states can emulate. At present, the law is in a state of
transition in the appropriation states and there is often dissension among
the legislative, agency, and judicial forces brought to bear on the
question. Thus, the interstate conflict between Montana and Wyoming
presents a unique opportunity to reform a broken system, and this
opportunity should be seized.

62

If Montana were held to a different standard than Wyoming, it would also open the door
for Wyoming to argue that depletions on the Montana side of the Basin may be due in part to
Montana-permitted CBM wells.
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III. SEIZING A RARE OPPORTUNITY BEFORE IT IS TOO LATE
Rarely does a water law question that is confounding several states
land squarely before the U.S. Supreme Court in the context of an
interstate waters dispute. While it is admittedly not the Supreme Court’s
responsibility to solve the legal paradoxes of state water law, the western
states may nonetheless be secondary beneficiaries of the conclusions and
solutions that emerge from the Montana v. Wyoming CBM dispute.
Further, there are several major CBM basins that straddle state lines in
the West, suggesting the likelihood of future interstate waters disputes
that raise similar issues to those in Montana v. Wyoming. 63 Because of
the unique role of the Special Master, 64 the western states can benefit
from both an expert synthesis of this water law issue and an expert
recommendation on how to resolve the issue through regulatory and
management regimes. At the very least, these states should pay careful
attention not only to the Special Master’s rulings on the question, but
also to the on-the-ground successes and failures that will ensue as
Wyoming and Montana attempt to comply with those rulings.
Thus, although it is customary for courts to address legal questions
on their narrowest grounds, a broader approach is warranted in the case
of Montana v. Wyoming. For example, while a decisionmaker may be
inclined to resolve the more limited question of how CBM development
may harm pre-1950 water rights, the hydrogeologic reality suggests that
post-1950 water rights would also be impacted and should therefore be
considered as part of a single water resource. Further, a decisionmaker
may be inclined to simply rule that Wyoming cease withdrawing
groundwater in violation of the Compact, leaving it to the States to work
out the specifics of that ruling. But the stalemate between Montana and
Wyoming, combined with a general recalcitrance among the western

63

See COALBED METHANE PRODUCED WATER, supra note 1, at 20 fig.2.1 (depicting several
major coalbed methane basins that straddle state lines in Montana, Wyoming, Utah, Colorado, and
New Mexico); see also CBM PRIMER, supra note 1, at 7–8 figs.5, 6.
64
Carstens makes the following observations about the Special Master process:
The appointment of a Special Master may be initiated either on motion, which the Court may
refuse to grant, or at the Court's own prerogative. After appointing a Special Master, the
Court provides little supervision of the master's proceedings. Even as a preliminary matter,
no rule governing Supreme Court practice expressly provides for the appointment of Special
Masters, as contrasted with the appointment mechanism for special masters in the lower
federal courts set forth in Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. . . .
Practice and time have shown that the Court generally adopts the Special Masters' reports,
even when those reports make conclusions of law in addition to resolving issues of fact.
Carstens, supra note 11, at 653, 655–56 (footnote omitted).
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states to regulate CBM development, suggests that a more directed and
guided court remedy is warranted—a remedy that requires
comprehensively managing connected surface and groundwaters in the
Basin. 65
Absent a broader resolution of the CBM issue, it is highly likely that
the litigants will return to the Supreme Court to seek resolution of these
questions in the future. Additionally, private parties affected by CBM
development may commence federal litigation against the States and the
Compact Commission for failing to fully perform the terms of the
Compact. 66 In other words, it is a wise use of judicial resources to
address these questions while the litigation is before the Supreme Court.
Aside from the likelihood of additional litigation, there is an even
greater hydrological risk that comes with allowing further time to lapse
before CBM groundwater withdrawals are comprehensively addressed.
As John Leshy noted in his seminal work on interstate groundwater
resources:
[S]ome aquifers are “recharged,” or replenished, very slowly or not at
all, and artificial recharge may not be possible. Pumping water from
these aquifers may amount to mining a non-renewable resource . . . .
[M]uch groundwater is connected hydrologically to surface waters; in
fact, the U.S. Geological Survey now estimates that groundwater is the
source of almost 40 percent of the streamflow in the entire country. As
groundwater extraction increases, surface streams may dwindle or
disappear, and rights to use water from those streams may go
unsatisfied, even though typically they were established first. . . .
Confined to pore spaces in geological beds, groundwater tends to
move much more slowly than surface water. As a result, the impact of
withdrawals from a well . . . on the flows of watercourses on the
surface[] may not be perceived for months, years, or even decades. . . .
[T]he more we learn about groundwater, the more we learn it is
connected to surface watercourses, which themselves often cross state
lines. . . . Moreover, it seems the more we learn about the subsurface,

65

To the extent that the States show a fresh interest in negotiating a settlement regarding
CBM water use, the Court’s guidance is equally helpful in that situation.
66
YELLOWSTONE RIVER COMPACT, supra note 7, art. III. This article creates the
Commission and charges it with “carry[ing] out the provisions of this Compact.” This article also
authorizes the Commission to be sued in its official capacity. For an example of a private action
under the Compact, see Intake Water Co. v. Yellowstone River Compact Comm'n, 590 F. Supp. 293,
294 (D. Mont. 1983) (recognizing federal subject matter jurisdiction over a private water
development company’s suit to challenge Article X of the Compact relating to restrictions on out-ofbasin transfers).
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the more likely we may find that seemingly isolated local aquifers
connect to other aquifers that have connections across state lines
through groundwater or surface water. . . .
Where groundwater extraction (in general, and perhaps especially
where interstate groundwater extraction) is involved, if it turns out the
impact is significant, by the time this fact becomes known, mitigating
it may be difficult, if not impossible. 67

These words apply directly to the Yellowstone River Basin, in
which the U.S. Geological Survey has documented vast underground
aquifers that extend beneath both Wyoming and Montana. 68 A significant
portion of these aquifers is part of the greater Northern Great Plains
aquifer system. The groundwater in these aquifers, as the surface waters
above, flows in a north and northeasterly direction from Wyoming into
Montana, where much of the water is used for domestic and irrigation
supply. 69 Further, the studies reflect a high level of groundwater and
surface water connectivity, with surface waters influencing aquifer
formations and groundwater discharging to surface waters in places
throughout the Yellowstone River Basin. The studies also reflect
complex and yet-to-be-understood relationships among the various
aquifers, which are both confined and unconfined, and found at various
depths below the ground surface. The risks of diminished water supply
and dewatering are imminent and real. 70
This data only scratches the surface of information that might be
developed for the Powder River Basin. But one thing is clear: CBM
resources crisscross the very same strata in which this complex system of
groundwater aquifers resides, and CBM groundwater pumping is
occurring at an unprecedented rate. 71 Coalbed methane wells in the Basin
67

John D. Leshy, Interstate Groundwater Resources: The Federal Role, 14 HASTINGS W.NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1475, 1477, 1479, 1481, 1497 (2008) (footnote omitted); see also
Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Integrating Use of Ground and Surface Water in Wyoming, 47 IDAHO L.
REV. 51, 62 (2010) (“It is widely acknowledged that, sooner or later, most ground water uses will
reduce water available in surface water sources. It is really only a matter of when and how much.”
(footnote omitted)).
68
See RONALD B. ZELT ET AL., U.S. DEPT. OF INTERIOR, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY,
ENVIRONMENTAL SETTING OF THE YELLOWSTONE RIVER BASIN, MONTANA, NORTH DAKOTA, AND
WYOMING 52–55 & fig.16 (1999), available at pubs.usgs.gov/wri/wri984269/wri984269.pdf.
69
See R. L. WHITEHEAD, U.S. DEPT. OF INTERIOR, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, GROUND
WATER ATLAS OF THE UNITED STATES: MONTANA, NORTH DAKOTA, SOUTH DAKOTA, WYOMING,
The Northern Great Plains Aquifer System & fig.50 (1996), available at
pubs.usgs.gov/ha/ha730/ch_i/I-text2.html.
70
See CBM PRIMER, supra note 1, at 14.
71
See ZELT ET AL., supra note 68, at 21–22 (identifying strata later discussed as housing
aquifer systems).
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pump at a higher daily volume than any other major CBM basin. 72 An
animated map produced by the Wyoming State Geological Survey
(WSGS) shows that by 2007 CBM water production had reached 2.5
billion gallons per month on the Wyoming side of the Basin 73 —a figure
that may be conservative based on other estimates of nine billion gallons
per month. 74 Even under more conservative figures, one month of CBM
groundwater pumping consumes a water quantity that would serve the
entire City of Sheridan, Wyoming, for over three years. 75 Further,
Wyoming estimates that the CBM industry has the capacity to install
wells at the rate of 100 per week, with approximately 30,000 wells
forecasted to be running today and 50,000-100,000 wells at full buildout. 76 The Wyoming Coal Bed Natural Gas Water Management Task
Force estimates that from 2006 to 2029, cumulative CBM water
production in the Basin will reach 11.6 billion barrels (or 487.2 billion
gallons). 77
Wyoming’s CBM literature acknowledges a lack of understanding
about aquifer recharge and the reality that “it may take hundreds of years
to fully recharge” the withdrawn waters. 78 The U.S. Department of
Interior similarly estimates aquifer drawdowns of several hundred feet in
some areas of the Basin, with a full aquifer recovery that would extend
“over the next hundred years” 79 —“not happening within the lifetimes of
any of the state’s residents.” 80 By that time the CBM well, which has a
seven-to-ten-year life span, will have long been abandoned and the
72

See CBM PRIMER, supra note 1, at 14 tbl.2.
Wyoming
State
Geological
Survey,
Powder
River
Basin
Animation,
www.wsgs.uwyo.edu/GIS_and_online_maps/Animations/PRB.aspx (last visited Mar. 12, 2012). The
animation presents the unit of measurement as a BBL or barrel. One barrel equals approximately
forty-two gallons of water. COALBED METHANE PRODUCED WATER, supra note 1, at 36 n.5.
74
See supra note 6 (discussing range of figures available in the CBM literature).
75
POWDER/TONGUE RIVER BASIN WATER PLAN TECHNICAL MEMORANDA, HKM
Engineering, Inc. (Feb. 2002), available at waterplan.state.wy.us/plan/powder/techmemos/
muniuse.html (noting Sheridan’s annual use of 689.72 million gallons of water).
76
See RODNEY H. De BRUIN ET AL., WYOMING STATE GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, COALBED
METHANE IN WYOMING, INFORMATION PAMPHLET 7, at 20 (2d ed. 2004), available at
www.wsgs.uwyo.edu/docs/coalbed.pdf; CBM PRIMER, supra note 1, at 11 & fig.8.
77
WYOMING COAL BED NATURAL GAS WATER MANAGEMENT TASK FORCE INTERIM
REPORT 6 (Dec. 14, 2006) (on file with author).
78
See DE BRUIN ET AL., supra note 76, at 19–20.
79
See BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, WYOMING POWDER RIVER BASIN
FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT xxxi, 4–38 (Jan. 2003), available at
www.blm.gov/pgdata/etc/medialib/blm/wy/information/NEPA/prb-feis/vol_1.Par.67414.File.dat/
front3.pdf.
80
BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, MONTANA STATEWIDE DRAFT OIL
AND GAS ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 4–37
(Jan. 2002), available at
bogc.dnrc.mt.gov/webmapper_cbm_info_res.asp.
73
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producer will have moved on. 81
Another sobering reality is that we cannot find solace in either
Montana’s or Wyoming’s water permitting systems. Both States, like
other appropriative rights states dealing with CBM development, are
widely criticized for their handling of CBM. 82 Most notably, both States
allow pumping without preliminary inquiry into the harm to existing
water rights holders. 83 Both also allow the massive wasting of pumped
groundwater via discharges or storage in evaporation holding ponds. 84
And while Montana law does provide for some compensation to injured
well owners, surface water owners are not compensated, and the burden
of proof is on the injured water user to prove causation 85 —no small task
in light of the hydrogeologic complexities discussed above. In this
regard, Montana’s allegations against Wyoming’s CBM development
ring slightly disingenuous because Montana is perpetrating similar harms
against its own water rights holders. This of course does not excuse
Wyoming’s violations of the Compact. Nor should it alter the outcome of
the case. But it does suggest that reforms on Montana’s part are also
necessary. Indeed, careful management on the Montana side will be
important to ensure that its water users receive the Compact benefits that
Montana negotiated for them back in 1950.
In the not-so-distant past, states handled groundwater
81

See CBM PRIMER, supra note 1, at 7.
See generally Barrett, supra note 51; see Robert E. Beck, Current Water Issues in Oil and
Gas Development and Production: Will Water Control What Energy We Have?, 49 WASHBURN L.J.
423 (2010); see also Samantha Bohrman, Groundwater Conservation and Coalbed Methane
Development in the Powder River Basin, 24 LAW & INEQ. 181 (2006); Bryner, supra note 51;
MacKinnon & Fox, supra note 51; James Murphy, Slowing the Onslaught and Forecasting Hope for
Change: Litigation Efforts Concerning the Environmental Impacts of Coalbed Methane
Development in the Powder River Basin, 24 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 399 (2007); Neal Joseph Valorz,
Comment, The Need for Codification of Wyoming’s Coal Bed Methane Produced Groundwater
Laws, 10 WYO. L. REV. 115 (2010).
83
See MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-510 (Westlaw 2011) (placing CBM permitting under the
jurisdiction of the Montana Board of Oil & Gas and outside of the water rights permitting process
that examines injury under Mont. Code Ann. § 85-2-311); see also WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-931
(Westlaw 2011), generally requiring that applications “be granted as a matter of course.” Wyoming
scholars note that the state engineer does not as a matter of practice evaluate harm to existing water
users before permitting a new groundwater well. See MacDonnell, supra note 67, at 53 n.20; see also
Lawrence J. Wolfe & Jennifer G. Hager, Wyoming’s Groundwater Laws: Quantity and Quality
Regulation, 24 LAND & WATER L. REV. 39, 48, 62–64 (1989) (describing a process whereby senior
appropriators object to interference by junior users after the juniors have obtained a permit).
84
See MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-505(1) (Westlaw 2011) (prohibiting waste of groundwater
but specifically exempting the “management, discharge, or reinjection of ground water produced in
association with a coalbed methane well” from the definition of waste); see also Revised Interim
Policy Memo from Patrick T. Tyrrell, State Engineer, to Wyoming State Engineer’s Office at 4–5
(Apr. 26, 2004) (allowing produced groundwater to be disposed of via evaporation, infiltration, or
discharge into reservoirs or leach fields) (on file with author).
85
See MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-11-175 (Westlaw 2011).
82
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complexities by simply ignoring groundwater issues until they reached
crisis proportions. 86 We can no longer afford that approach. If a
comprehensive, proactive remedy is not prescribed in the Montana v.
Wyoming litigation, the odds of significant, perhaps irreversible, damage
appear high. While the task of fashioning that remedy is daunting, it will
be exponentially harder if we wait until some distant date in the future to
unravel the consequences of the CBM development that is spreading
rapidly across the face of the Powder River Basin landscape.
IV. MOVING TOWARDS A MEANINGFUL REMEDY FOR WATER RIGHTS
USERS
In its Complaint, Montana requests that Wyoming pay monetary
damages for the wrongful water depletions it has caused. Montana also
asks the U.S. Supreme Court to prospectively “command[] the State of
Wyoming in the future to deliver the waters of the Tongue and Powder
Rivers in accordance with the provisions of the Yellowstone River
Compact” and to grant such “other relief as the Court deems just and
proper.” 87 The Supreme Court may provide such prospective remedies to
avoid further breaches of the Compact. 88
At this juncture, it is important to note that the Special Master has
yet to hear evidence and make findings about the extent to which CBM
groundwater withdrawals are connected to and depleting surface waters
covered by the Compact. 89 In that sense the logical leap to remedies may
appear premature. There are two important reasons why it is not. First,
the existing, albeit incomplete, geohydrologic studies of the Basin
indicate a high likelihood of connectivity and injury throughout the
Basin. 90 To the extent that any particular CBM well is shown to be
unconnected to surface waters, that is no guarantee that other, future
wells will also be unconnected. There is thus an ongoing risk of future
injury that can only be addressed through prospective Compact remedies.
Second, the magnitude of the risk, and its potentially irreversible and
long-term nature, 91 warrant an abundance of caution―essentially the
exercise of a precautionary remedy―until the States have more fully and

86

Leshy, supra note 67, at 1492 (discussing how the complication and cost of groundwater
management is a major reason that state governments “have put off grappling with the challenge
until a true crisis looms”).
87
Bill of Complaint, supra note 7, at 5.
88
See Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 554, 568 (1983).
89
See supra note 14 and related discussion.
90
See discussion supra Parts II and III.B.
91
See discussion supra Parts II and III.B.
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accurately studied the impacts of CBM production on the Basin’s surface
water supply. 92
As the Special Master determines the appropriate remedies in
Montana v. Wyoming, there are three principal steps he can take to set
Montana and Wyoming CBM development on a better course toward
Compact compliance. First, the Special Master should extend his
groundwater ruling to post-1950 water rights so that those rights are also
protected from CBM groundwater withdrawals. Only by addressing the
full spectrum of Compact water rights will the States be in a position to
cohesively regulate CBM groundwater pumping in the Basin. Second,
because the Compact expressly adopts the principles of prior
appropriation, the Special Master should identify the ways in which the
States’ existing CBM regulations violate those principles. Third, the
Special Master should require that groundwater modeling, data
collection, and reporting occur in the Basin to ensure through sound
science that CBM development is not injuring Compact water rights.
Ultimately, these steps may also help guide the greater community of
prior appropriation states grappling with CBM groundwater use.
A.

AN ADEQUATE REMEDY REQUIRES THAT THE SPECIAL MASTER’S
CONCLUSION ABOUT GROUNDWATER BE EXTENDED TO POST-1950
RIGHTS UNDER THE COMPACT

The Special Master has already concluded that Wyoming CBM
groundwater pumping violates the Compact if it depletes surface waters
allocated to Montana’s pre-1950 water rights users. 93 Montana’s
Complaint broadly asserts that Wyoming’s CBM groundwater
withdrawals constitute a “violation of Montana’s rights under Article V
of the Compact,” which covers post-1950 rights as well. 94 Although the
Special Master originally reserved all questions about post-1950 water
rights, 95 he subsequently held that Montana must seek leave to amend its
Complaint to more particularly describe its post-1950 claims. 96 This
leave should be granted so that the Special Master and the U.S. Supreme
Court can holistically address the impact of CBM groundwater
production on Compact water rights. Indeed, the question is important
enough that the parties should stipulate to allowing the Special Master to
consider all Compact water rights when fashioning a remedy relating to
92

Such a precautionary approach is described further in Part III.C, infra.
See First Interim Report, supra note 12, at 89-90.
94
See discussion supra Part I.A; Bill of Complaint, supra note 7, ¶ 11.
95
First Interim Report, supra note 12, at 93.
96
See generally Opinion on Article V(B) Claims, supra note 61.
93
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CBM groundwater withdrawals. Ignoring post-1950 water rights would
invite future litigation and unnecessarily complicate the regulation of
surface and groundwater withdrawals in the Basin.
Although the year 1950 marks an important temporal line for
purposes of distinguishing Compact water rights, that temporal
significance fades in the face of the hydrogeologic realities of the Basin.
Both pre- and post-1950 water rights draw upon the same surface water
supply, and both are equally vulnerable to depletion from CBM
groundwater withdrawals. Coalbed methane groundwater pumping could
deplete surface waters that would otherwise pass across the hydrologic
“point of measurement” and be equitably divided between the States as
part of the Compact’s post-1950 waters rights allocation. 97 This
depletion would amount to a skimming off the “bottom” before the
Compact’s water accounting takes place. Further, to the extent that
Wyoming is curtailing delivery of Montana’s pre-1950 water rights,
those senior users on the Montana side may in turn be dipping into the
waters otherwise available to Montana’s junior, post-1950 users. As the
Special Master has already concluded, the science and law of water,
including prior Supreme Court compact decisions, have evolved to treat
connected waters as a jointly managed resource. 98 Thus, an integrated
analysis of CBM impacts to all Compact water rights is critical to
achieving an adequate remedy in the case. 99
The Compact sends strong signals that post-1950 water rights are
protected by the same prior appropriation principles that the Supreme
Court and Special Master applied to pre-1950 water rights:
Of the unused and unappropriated waters of the interstate tributaries of
the Yellowstone River as of January 1, 1950, there is allocated to each
signatory state such quantity of that water as shall be necessary to
provide supplemental water supplies for the [pre-1950 appropriative]
rights described in paragraph A of this Article V, such supplemental
rights to be acquired and enjoyed in accordance with the laws
governing the acquisition and use of water under the doctrine of
appropriation, and the remainder of the unused and unappropriated
water is allocated to each state for storage or direct diversions for

97

See discussion supra Part I.A (discussing allocation of post-1950 waters); YELLOWSTONE
RIVER COMPACT, supra note 7, art. V(B) (noting the points of measurement on the Tongue and
Powder Rivers).
98
See supra notes 56 and 57, and related discussion.
99
The Special Master has concluded that the post-1950 rights must yield to the pre-1950
rights in the way that junior users must yield to senior users under the appropriative system. See First
Interim Report, supra note 12, at 89.
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beneficial use on new lands or for other purposes as follows . . . . 100

Article V(B) contemplates two categories of post-1950 water rights:
(1) water rights that can be used to supplement pre-1950 water rights on
existing irrigated lands; and (2) new water rights for storage, direct
diversions, or other purposes on new lands, based on a percentage
allocation. With respect to the first category, Article V(B) mentions the
doctrine of appropriation and highlights the high priority the States
placed on irrigation purposes. With respect to the second category,
Article V(B) recites the classic appropriative requirement of beneficial
use. Nothing in this provision suggests that the pumping of high volumes
of hydrologically connected groundwater, which could injure surface
water rights users, would be acceptable to the signatory States.
The parties’ actions at the time of compacting further corroborate
that post-1950 water uses are subject to and protected by prior
appropriation principles. When Montana codified the Compact and
related implementing statutes in 1953, it specifically provided that:
All appropriative rights to the beneficial uses of the waters of the
interstate tributaries of the Yellowstone River acquired after January
1, 1950, are subject to distribution in the states of Montana and
Wyoming . . . as provided in subsections [B] and [C] of Article V of
said compact. The purpose of this part is to provide the means to
determine the various appropriative rights to the beneficial uses of
water of the interstate tributaries of the Yellowstone River acquired
after January 1, 1950, and the quantity of water diverted and used by
each such appropriator during each year, to enable the state of
Montana and the Yellowstone River Compact [C]ommission to
comply with and to administer the percentage allocations as provided
101
in subsections [B] and [C] of Article V of said compact.

Wyoming adopted a similar statutory expectation, providing that
“[t]he state engineer may issue his approval of an application proposing
to divert compact water allocated to Wyoming if (i) [t]he diversion and
the ultimate use of the water are for a beneficial use of water; and (ii)
[t]he diversion and ultimate use of water will not adversely affect the
water rights of other persons . . . .” 102 And as the Special Master has
recognized, both States long ago extended their prior appropriation laws
100

YELLOWSTONE RIVER COMPACT, supra note 7, art. V(B) (emphasis added).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-20-102 (Westlaw 2011) (enacted 1953) (emphasis added).
102
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-12-607(b)(i),(ii) (Westlaw 2011) (enacted 1957) (emphasis added);
see id. § 41-12-605(a)(i),(ii) (using nearly identical language in describing required contents of
application for approval).
101
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to groundwater, 103 lending further credence to the conclusion that the
Compact’s appropriation principles must govern and limit CBM
groundwater withdrawals.
Further relevant are the Compact’s exceptions for single-household
domestic uses and stockwater reservoirs not exceeding 20 acre-feet in
capacity. 104 These narrow categories are the only uses that the States
agreed could occur outside of the Compact’s division of waters under
Article V(B). Such de minimis uses are strikingly different from CBM
development, which pumps billions of gallons of water annually.
Likewise, the Compact’s repeated emphasis on “the great
importance of water for irrigation” and the Commission’s authority to
recommend water reallocations for irrigable lands signals an overriding
intent to safeguard this type of beneficial use. 105 Although the
legislatures of Wyoming and Montana have subsequently adopted public
policies to promote CBM development, 106 those state-level policies
cannot trump the multilateral, congressionally codified policies of the
Compact. 107 The parties in 1950 signaled a clear intent that future uses of
Basin waters would be beneficially applied and not pumped out of
priority and then wasted to the detriment of irrigators, livestock
producers, and others seeking to eke out a living in the arid lands of the
Basin. The Special Master’s observations about pre-1950 water rights are
thus equally apropos for post-1950 water rights:
Given the purposes of the Compact, “neither the parties to the
Compact, nor the Congress and the President who approved it, could
have intended that an upstream State could, with impunity, unilaterally
enlarge its allocation by taking some of the virgin water supply before
it reached the stream flow.” 108

Finally, the parties stated that they intended an “equitable division

103

See supra notes 58 and 59, and related discussion.
See YELLOWSTONE RIVER COMPACT, supra note 7, arts. V(E)(1), II(I).
105
Id. pmbl. & art. V(F). As noted, Article V(B) also creates a hierarchy that places
supplemental irrigation rights first.
106
The Montana Legislature has even gone so far as to classify CBM development as a
“compelling state interest.” MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-11-173 (Westlaw 2011).
107
Interestingly, there is an additional question as to whether Montana’s current CBM
regulations contravene the Montana Constitution’s requirement that “[t]he legislature shall . . . enact
laws and provide appropriations to protect, enhance, and develop all agriculture.” MONT. CONST. art.
XII, § 1(1). Or the Montana Constitution’s requirement that state waters be treated as a public trust
and allocated according to prior appropriation principles. MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 3.
108
First Interim Report, supra note 12, at 53 (citing First Report of the Special Master,
Kansas v. Nebraska, No. 126, Orig., at 21 (Jan. 28, 2000)).
104

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2012

23

Golden Gate University Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 6

320

GOLDEN GATE UNIV. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW J.

[Vol. 5

and apportionment” of the Basin’s waters. 109 Although equitable
apportionment is a doctrine that typically applies to interstate water
disputes in the absence of a compact, in this case the parties expressly
incorporated similar principles into the Compact. 110 They first stated that
they intended the division of waters to be “equitable,” 111 and later went
so far as to give the Compact Commission the powers to recommend
modifications to the percentage allocations for post-1950 waters to
ensure the divisions are “fair, just, and equitable.” 112 Thus, the parties
intended to follow notions of equity and fairness that echo the principles
of the equitable apportionment doctrine.
The Supreme Court describes the equitable apportionment doctrine
as seeking a “just and equitable” allocation of water under which a
“delicate adjustment of interests . . . must be made.” 113 It has noted in
prior interstate water disputes that states “have an affirmative duty under
the doctrine of equitable apportionment to take reasonable steps to
conserve and even to augment the natural resources within their borders
for the benefit of other States.” 114 Because the parties entering into the
Compact used remarkably similar wording to that of the Supreme Court,
the evidence suggests that they too were seeking to delicately balance the
interests of the States. Some three decades after the parties agreed to this
equity, the States have introduced a new use that throws the system out
of balance. It is impossible to conceive of a way that the Compact can
fairly divide post-1950 waters without factoring in the millions of gallons
of groundwater pumped each day that are likely contributing to the loss
of surface waters in the Basin. 115 The parties’ inability to right the
balance on their own leaves the matter best resolved by the U.S. Supreme
Court, working through its Special Master.
It is important to view these various statements of the parties’ intent
109

See YELLOWSTONE RIVER COMPACT, supra note 7, pmbl.
Equitable apportionment is a doctrine that has evolved through Supreme Court
jurisprudence involving interstate water disputes. Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 183
(1982). Under this doctrine the Court considers a variety of factors, including: “physical and climatic
conditions, the consumptive use of water in the several sections of the river, the character and rate of
return flows, the extent of established uses, the availability of storage water, the practical effect of
wasteful uses on downstream areas, [and] the damage to upstream areas as compared to the benefits
to downstream areas if a limitation is imposed on the former.” Id. (quoting Nebraska v. Wyoming,
325 U.S. 589, 618 (1945)).
111
YELLOWSTONE RIVER COMPACT, supra note 7, pmbl.
112
Id. art. V(F).
113
See Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. at 183.
114
Idaho v. Oregon, 462 U.S. 1017, 1025 (1983) (discussing salmon).
115
CBM PRIMER, supra note 1, at 15 (estimating that the average flow from a CBM well in
the Powder River Basin is 12–15 gallons/minute, which roughly translates to 17,000–21,000 gallons
per day per well).
110
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as a whole and give them each effect. In a prior case involving the
Yellowstone River Compact during the late 1970s and early 1980s, a
federal district court first had the opportunity to interpret the Compact.
The case, Utah International Inc. v. Intake Water Co., 116 involved
private water suppliers seeking to develop water storage, and it provided
some important guidance on compact construction:
To begin with, each article of the Compact is presumptively consistent
with the body of the Compact as a whole, and is entitled to its
presumptive validity and consistency until it is otherwise clearly
shown. Beyond that basic tenet of statutory construction, it is further
to be presumed that each article of the Compact was crafted by its
drafters to serve a specific purpose; it is the obligation of this Court to
give effect to that purpose. 117

The Compact provisions described above, when viewed as a whole,
demonstrate that Wyoming and Montana intended that post-1950 water
uses follow the principles of prior appropriation and that a highly
consumptive use such as CBM would have to be properly accounted for
under those principles. Thus, the very same analysis that the Special
Master applied to pre-1950 water rights holds true for the post-1950
Compact provisions. To give effect to these Compact provisions and
ensure they serve their specific purposes, the Montana v. Wyoming
litigation must address CBM’s impacts on the full spectrum of water
rights protected under Article V. Such an approach not only serves the
purposes of the Compact, but better positions the parties to address the
hydrogeologic complexities of CBM water use in an integrated manner.
By including all Compact water rights in the litigation, the Special
Master can then take the next step of identifying the areas where current
Wyoming and Montana CBM regulations fail to protect Compact water
116

Utah Int’l Inc. v. Intake Water Co. 484 F. Supp. 36 (D. Mont. 1979). The dispute in Utah
Int’l Inc. involved two private companies fighting over which had the more senior priority date to
develop water. Id. at 39. One company argued that it did not have to submit to Montana’s
appropriative rules and permitting requirements in developing water on the Wyoming side of the
Yellowstone River Basin. The other argued that the first company would be using post-1950 waters
allocated to Montana under the Compact and therefore was subject to Montana rules. While the
district court declined to consider several issues that were already pending before a Montana state
court, it did set forth the above guiding principle in determining that both states exercised shared
jurisdiction over the water permit applications. Id. at 44–45. Five years later, one of the litigants
would go back to court to litigate a separate issue under the Compact. In that case, the Ninth Circuit
observed in passing that “[t]he Yellowstone River Compact fixes the water usage of all waters of the
Yellowstone River Basin.” Intake Water Co. v. Yellowstone River Compact Comm'n, 769 F.2d 568,
569 (9th Cir. 1985) (emphasis added).
117
Utah Int’l Inc., at 44–45.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2012

25

Golden Gate University Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 6

322

GOLDEN GATE UNIV. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW J.

[Vol. 5

rights.
B.

AN ADEQUATE REMEDY REQUIRES IDENTIFYING HOW THE STATES’
CURRENT CBM REGULATIONS VIOLATE PRINCIPLES OF PRIOR
APPROPRIATION

The path of CBM regulation in the West has been one marked by
legislative accommodation of CBM development. 118 By and large, the
CBM industry permitting process operates outside of the prior
appropriation system. To the extent states subject CBM to water rights
permitting review, it is a superficial form of review that fails to
meaningfully analyze injury to existing water users. Wyoming and
Montana are no exception, which becomes problematic when the
Compact provides that the waters within the Basin must be used in
accordance with appropriative principles. Using the Supreme Court’s
Opinion on Exception to Report of Special Master (discussed in Part I) as
guidance, the Special Master can look to the appropriative laws both
prior to and following the parties’ entry into the Compact, along with
prevailing legal scholarship, 119 to identify where CBM regulations fall
short. This step is integral to the parties’ remedy because, absent specific
directives from the Supreme Court, the legislatures of both States are
unlikely to enact the regulatory reforms necessary for Compact
compliance.
The States’ regulatory approach to CBM production runs afoul of
several traditional concepts of prior appropriation. First, CBM
groundwater pumping creates a level of waste that the West has never
118

Legislatures, in fact, often undo judicial decisions requiring a deeper review of CBM
groundwater withdrawals. As one example, the Montana Legislature disagreed with a judicial
decision holding that CBM groundwater withdrawals must be reviewed for injury to senior
appropriators from the initial point of withdrawal. The MDNRC had been reviewing the question of
injury only if, after withdrawal, the CBM developer wanted to apply the produced water to another
use. The MDNRC created a legal fiction that required review of the application as one for surface
water use whose source was the pipeline into which the water had been pumped. See infra note 156
and related text for a discussion of the case and regulatory background. The Montana Legislature
passed HB 575, which was intended to supersede the court’s holding. Montana Legislature, Detailed
Bill Information 2009, H.B. 575, laws.leg.mt.gov/laws09/LAW0203W$BSRV.ActionQuery?
P_BLTP_BILL_TYP_CD=HB&P_BILL_NO=575&P_BILL_DFT_NO=&P_CHPT_NO=&Z_ACT
ION=Find&P_SBJ_DESCR=&P_SBJT_SBJ_CD=&P_LST_NM1=&P_ENTY_ID_SEQ=
(last
visited Mar. 12, 2012). The Governor ultimately vetoed the legislation because it “reverses
longstanding principles of Western and Montana water law by allowing the issuance of a permit for
the use of water associated with coal be methane (“CBM”) production without providing protection
to senior water rights holders.” Letter from Brian Schweitzer, Governor of Montana, to Linda
McCulloch, Secretary of State (Apr. 29, 2009), available at data.opi.mt.gov/bills/2009/
AmdHtmH/hb0575govveto.HTM.
119
See generally supra notes 51 and 83 (citing recent and prominent scholarship on CBM).
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known or tolerated in water law. Even under new legislative
machinations to categorize CBM groundwater withdrawals as a
“beneficial use,” there is no analysis of whether the CBM wells are
operating at an efficiency level traditionally required under a water rights
permit. There is also an unresolved question of whether CBM by-product
water is beneficially used when it reaches the surface. The predominant
model is to either discharge the water across the land or store it in
evaporation ponds, 120 neither of which involves beneficial use. Second,
the States are avoiding the fundamental, threshold inquiry asked of all
new water users: “Will your proposed use injure existing water rights?”
Instead of answering this question, CBM operators advance on a
permitting fast track that bypasses all injury analysis. In keeping with the
body of legal scholarship calling for reform, the Special Master should
thus focus on the ways that CBM production is permitted to violate the
no-waste and no-injury rules of prior appropriation.
i.

CBM Groundwater Pumping Violates the No-Waste Rule of Prior
Appropriation

The Compact requires that the States beneficially use all waters they
divert in the Basin, 121 and “[t]he principal function of the beneficial use
doctrine is to prevent waste.” 122 Thus, the rule against waste must be
applied to CBM groundwater withdrawals that deplete the surface waters
of the Tongue and Powder Rivers. As discussed in Part II above, annual
CBM pumping in the Basin withdraws billions of gallons of groundwater

120

Although CBM producers may have the option of discharging the by-product water into
surface waters, this discharge requires a permit under the Clean Water Act and may have to be
treated to qualify for a permit. N. Plains Res. Council v. Fidelity Exploration & Dev. Co., 325 F.3d
1155 (9th Cir. 2003). Thus, the turning back of water is typically rejected in favor of more
economically expedient disposal methods such as reservoir storage. JOHN A. VEIL, U.S. DEPT. OF
ENERGY, REGULATORY ISSUES AFFECTING MANAGEMENT OF PRODUCED WATER FROM COAL BED
METHANE WELLS 4 (2002), available at www.netl.doe.gov/kmd/cds/disk2/RegulatoryIssues.pdf
(“Operators are likely to select the least-cost options that are authorized by state permitting
authorities.”); see also ALL CONSULTING & MONT. BD. OF OIL & GAS CONSERV., HANDBOOK ON
BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES AND MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR COAL BED METHANE IN THE
MONTANA PORTION OF THE POWDER RIVER BASIN 28 (Apr. 2002), available at
fossil.energy.gov/programs/oilgas/environment/publications/BMPHandbookFinal.pdf
[hereinafter
BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES] (describing impoundments).
121
See discussion supra Parts I.A and III.A.
122
A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES §§ 5:67–68 (2011); see also
2-12 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 12.02 (Robert E. Beck & Amy K. Kelley eds., 3d ed. 2010)
(noting that “water must be put to [beneficial] use and not ‘let run to waste’”); 94 C.J.S. Waters §
395 (2011) (noting that the “rule limiting the prior appropriator to the amount reasonably necessary
for the purposes of the appropriation places him or her under a duty to avoid waste and use
reasonable care and economy to prevent unnecessary loss in the diversion and use of the water”).

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2012

27

Golden Gate University Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 6

324

GOLDEN GATE UNIV. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW J.

[Vol. 5

that have a high likelihood of surface water connectivity. 123 The States
permit this pumping without an advance review of either the
wastefulness associated with the CBM wells or the subsequent
wastefulness that occurs during disposal of CBM by-product water.
While the use of water is admittedly never one hundred percent
efficient, there is a point at which waste becomes too great to be
permitted under the law. A water user cannot command excessive
amounts of water, even for an underlying beneficial use. 124 Nor can a
user simply store away water or run water across the surface of the land
at the expense of water rights holders who need water for beneficial use.
As Justice Cardozo concluded in the Walla Walla River interstate waters
dispute, “There must be no waste in arid lands of the ‘treasure’ of a river.
The essence of the doctrine of prior appropriation is beneficial
use . . . .” 125 A full century earlier, the U.S. Supreme Court held that an
“appropriation does not confer such an absolute right to the body of the
water diverted that the owner can allow it, after its diversion, to run to
waste and prevent others from using it . . . .” 126
The Wyoming Supreme Court echoed this sentiment in a state case
on waste: “It is the diversion of more water than can be consumed in
good faith . . . which creates the wasteful, non-beneficial use situation
now before us.” 127 The court continued by pointing out that the water
user’s duty includes “careful management and use, without wastage.” 128
Wyoming’s statutory and regulatory schemes echo these same
admonitions against waste. 129
123

See supra notes 6 and 68-77, and related discussion.
A classic case on point is Shodde v. Twin Falls Land & Water Co., 224 U.S. 107 (1912),
wherein an Idaho irrigator unsuccessfully argued he was entitled to the flow of the Snake River
beyond his actual water right to operate a water wheel apparatus that would lift water by buckets
onto his elevated fields. The U.S. Supreme Court held that his water right was limited to the amount
he could beneficially use, and he could not take surplus water just to operate his lift system. Id. at
123-26.
125
Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517, 527 (1936) (internal citations omitted).
126
Atchison v. Peterson, 87 U.S. 507, 514 (1874).
127
Basin Elec. Power Coop. v. State Bd. of Control, 578 P.2d 557, 569 (Wyo. 1978).
128
Id. at 573.
129
E.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-2-111 (Westlaw 2011) (authorizing the Wyoming Attorney
General to bring suit to prevent the waste of waters); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-909 (Westlaw 2011)
(giving the State Engineer power to prevent the waste of underground waters); WYO. STAT. ANN. §
41-3-912 (Westlaw 2011) (permitting the creation of underground control areas to address the
wasting of groundwater); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-603 (Westlaw 2011) (“The water commissioner
[of a water district] shall, as near as may be practicable, divide, regulate and control the use of the
water of all streams, springs, lakes or other sources of water within his district as will prevent the
waste of water or its use in excess of the volume to which the appropriator is lawfully entitled.”);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-501 (Westlaw 2011) (requiring beneficial use and prohibiting an
unpermitted diversion that is “to the detriment of others”).
124
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Montana similarly upholds the notions of beneficial use and nonwaste. In the seminal decision of Power v. Switzer, 130 the Montana
Supreme Court in 1898 held that a landowner who allowed unused water
to run across an open field was not beneficially using the water and had
to limit its diversion to beneficial use to prevent harm to junior users.
The court held:
[A]s the settlement of the [arid] country has advanced, the great value
of the use of water has become more and more apparent. Legislation
and judicial exposition have, accordingly, proceeded with increasing
caution to restrict appropriations to spheres of usefulness and
beneficial purposes. As a result, the law, crystallized in statutory form,
is that an appropriation of a right to the use of running water flowing
in the creeks must be for some useful or beneficial purpose . . . . 131

Here too the doctrine has found its way into Montana’s statutory
and regulatory law, 132 including the Water Use Act’s first sentence,
which states, “The general welfare of the people of Montana, in view of
the state’s population growth and expanding economy, requires that
water resources of the state be put to optimum beneficial use and not
wasted.” 133 Montana’s definition of waste includes “the unreasonable
loss of water” or “the application of water to anything but a beneficial
use.” 134 For several decades, Montana statutes have also provided that
“no ground water may be wasted.” 135
Coalbed methane has created a gaping hole in the traditional rule
against waste—a rule existing before, during, and after the creation of
the Compact—that undermines the very notion of beneficial use. 136 In
130

Power v. Switzer, 21 Mont. 523, 55 P. 32 (1898).
Id. at 529, 55 P. at 35.
132
E.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-114 (Westlaw 2011) (authorizing DNRC to petition the
court to prevent a person from “wasting water, using water unlawfully, [or] preventing water from
moving to another person having a prior right to use the water.”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-312
(1)(a) (Westlaw 2011) (“The department . . . may not issue a permit for more water . . . than can be
beneficially used without waste for the purpose stated in the application.); MONT. CODE ANN. § 852-406 (Westlaw 2011) (allowing the district court to modify permits in the event of waste); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 85-2-412 (Westlaw 2011) (requiring persons diverting surplus water “over and above
what is actually and necessarily used by the prior appropriator . . . to turn and cause to flow back into
the stream the surplus water.”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-505 (Westlaw 2011) (prohibiting the
waste of groundwater, with enumerated exemptions).
133
MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-1-101(1) (Westlaw 2011).
134
MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-102(23) (Westlaw 2011).
135
MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-505 (Westlaw 2011) (prohibiting the waste of groundwater,
with enumerated exemptions). This provision was adopted in 1961, codified as Rev. Code Mont. §
89-2926, when the state first enacted permitting requirements for groundwater.
136
For a sampling of scholarship making this point, see, for example, Barrett, supra note 51,
131
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2001 the Montana Legislature specifically exempted CBM groundwater
withdrawals from the statutory waste prohibition. 137 CBM groundwater
withdrawal is also placed entirely outside of the water rights permitting
process. Instead, the Montana Board of Oil and Gas Conservation
(MBOGC) exercises exclusive jurisdiction and makes no beneficial use
determination. 138 The Montana Department of Natural Resources and
Conservation (MDNRC) becomes involved only if a CBM producer later
wants to apply the by-product water to another use. 139 Further, CBM
producers are allowed to simply store the by-product water, without ever
putting it to a beneficial use. This storage violates the traditional prior
appropriation rule that “storage itself is not a beneficial use; storage is a
means to apply water to a beneficial use.” 140
Wyoming has taken only a slightly different tack. In the absence of
statutes on point, the Wyoming State Engineer has determined that CBM
groundwater pumping to enable CBM production is a beneficial use
requiring a permit. 141 These groundwater permits, however, are granted
“as a matter of course,” 142 without any analysis of waste. And when the
CBM by-product water will be discharged without further use, no permit
is required for the discharge. 143 Similarly, reservoir storage of CBM
produced groundwater, another popular disposal method among CBM
producers, 144 is not required to be applied to a beneficial use. 145 Neither
is there a beneficial use requirement for groundwater reinjected into
aquifers. 146 In fact, Wyoming’s regulations specifically exclude CBM
by-product groundwater from being stored underground for later
at 10681 (“The ‘beneficial use’ model . . . fails to account for the massive quantities of produced
water that often cannot be beneficially used in the traditional sense . . . .”); Murphy, supra note 82, at
409 (disposing of CBM by-product water without beneficial use is wasteful); MacKinnon & Fox,
supra note 51, at 378-84 (critiquing the lack of review of waste under Wyoming’s permitting
scheme).
137
MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-505(1)(e) (Westlaw 2011). This exemption was passed as part
of Montana Laws 2001, ch. 578, § 5.
138
MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-510 (Westlaw 2011).
139
MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-11-175(2)(a) (Westlaw 2011).
140
LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES, supra note 122, at § 5:37.
141
Revised Interim Policy Memo from Patrick T. Tyrrell, supra note 84.
142
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-931 (Westlaw 2011).
143
See generally WYOMING STATE ENGINEER’S OFFICE, GUIDANCE: CBM/GROUND WATER
PERMITS (Mar. 2004), available at seo.state.wy.us/PDF/GW_CBM%20Guidance.pdf; Revised
Interim Policy Memo from Patrick T. Tyrrell, supra note 84. The process is summarized in Dennis
Stickley & Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Wyoming's Legal Framework for Management of Water
Produced in Conjunction with Coal Bed Methane, 32 WYO. LAW. 24, 25 (Oct. 2009).
144
BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES, supra note 120, at 31.
145
WYO. CODE REG., General Agency, Board or Commission Rules, ch. 4, § 1 (Westlaw
2011).
146
Id.
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beneficial use. 147 Thus, there are several methods by which CBM byproduct water can be legally disposed of in Wyoming without being put
to a beneficial use. Even in those rare instances when a CBM producer
may choose to beneficially use the by-product water, 148 the damage and
waste caused by the initial groundwater pumping has already taken
place. Commentators reviewing the Wyoming permitting process have
observed that more must be done to avoid waste:
[The State Engineer’s Office should be] examining and properly
limiting the quantity of water produced in association with the
methane gas production process and ensuring that the water so
produced is, as far as possible, put to further beneficial use or made
available for future use. . . .
[W]e propose that the concept of beneficial use should be rigorously
applied to CBM water to avoid waste of water. The SEO should take
the requisite step, as was taken with surface water irrigation, and
149
establish in effect a “duty of water” for CBM.

Neither the Wyoming nor the Montana Supreme Court has ruled
upon whether the CBM statutes in their respective jurisdictions comply
with prior appropriation principles. In Montana, three district court
decisions have signaled a possible shift. The first decision concluded that
the MBOGC must consult with the MDNRC to ensure water rights are
protected in the course of MBOGC’s approval of CBM wells. 150 The
district court cited the “anticipated impacts, whether real or imagined, of
substantial dewatering of aquifers” as the justification for this
consultation and the reason why CBM waste needs to be treated
differently than other, more de minimis, forms of waste exempted from
the State’s anti-waste statute. 151 The court noted that CBM extraction
“dwarfs the amounts of water” contemplated by the other statutory
exemptions. 152 The court also held that all methods of CBM groundwater
147

WYO. CODE REG., Water Quality, ch. 16, app. A (Westlaw 2011). While this protection
makes sense from a water quality perspective, there are negative repercussions from a water quantity
perspective. Further, while reinjection into an aquifer is allowed, there is no assurance that the
reinjection will be into the same aquifer or that the reinjection will in fact protect senior water rights
holders in the Yellowstone River Basin. Id. at ch. 16, § 8(c)(ii).
148
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-904 (Westlaw 2011).
149
MacKinnon & Fox, supra note 51, at 378-84.
150
Diamond Cross Props., LLC v. State, No. DV05-70, 2008 Mont. Dist. Lexis 180 (Mont.
22d Jud. Dist. July 14, 2008).
151
Id. at *16 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-505(1)(e)).
152
Id. Other exempt uses include withdrawing water from test wells, temporarily losing water
from damaged wells that are diligently repaired, draining water off lands, removing water that is
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disposal must result in beneficial use of water, which would eliminate the
mere storage of by-product water. 153 Absent these steps, the court
expressed concern that the CBM well permitting process could violate
the Montana Constitution’s requirement of beneficial use according to
the principles of prior appropriation. 154
Another Montana district court concluded that applications to use
CBM by-product water must analyze the water as groundwater rather
than surface water. 155 This holding would require applicants to address
the groundwater’s connection to surface waters and prove that there is no
injury to existing water rights users. 156 And in a separate case, that same
district court held that CBM evaporation ponds that are not put to
beneficial use violate Montana law. 157 It remains to be seen whether
these rulings will be affirmed or result in statewide changes in the law.
On the Wyoming side of the ledger, a CBM challenge did reach the
Wyoming Supreme Court in a case where neighboring ranchers alleged,
inter alia, that the State of Wyoming illegally authorized CBM
groundwater pumping without considering beneficial use or waste and
without providing neighboring landowners with notice and an
opportunity to object. 158 Among their alleged damages, the ranchers
asserted lost vegetation, soil damage, and depleted well supplies. 159
Although the court dismissed the case for lack of a justiciable
controversy, 160 it issued this cautionary note:
By ruling that the Court does not have jurisdiction over the case, we
do not want to leave the impression that we approve of the State’s
administration of CBM water. West and Turner raise serious
allegations of damages to their property from CBM water and failures
on the part of the State to properly regulate CBM water statewide. 161

The judiciary’s growing discomfort with CBM regulations is clear.
interfering with traditional mining operations, or eliminating water used in traditional mining
operations. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-505(1)(e) (Westlaw 2011).
153
Id. at *22.
154
Id. (citing MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 3).
155
See generally N. Plains Res. Council, Inc. v. Montana Dep’t of Natural Res. &
Conservation, No. CDV-2007-425 (Mont. 1st Jud. Dist. Dec. 15, 2008), discussed supra note 118.
156
MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-311(1) (Westlaw 2011).
157
Tongue & Yellowstone Irrigation Dist. v. Montana Bd. of Oil and Gas Conservation, No.
BDV-2003-579, 2010 Mont. Dist. Lexis 116, at *17–18 (Mont. 1st Jud. Dist. Mar. 5, 2010).
158
William F. West Ranch, LLC v. Tyrrell, 2009 WY 62, ¶ 21, 206 P.3d 722, ¶ 21 (Wyo.
2009).
159
Id. ¶ 25.
160
Id. ¶ 22.
161
Id. ¶ 48.
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Although we see strong signals that these regulatory schemes may not
withstand judicial scrutiny, we have no certainty of the timeline under
which future state court rulings will issue. In the meantime, the States
continue to permit vast quantities of Basin groundwaters to be withdrawn
under suspect regulatory schemes that violate the no-waste rule and,
when there is surface water connectivity, the Compact. The Special
Master and the U.S. Supreme Court are thus uniquely situated to stop the
waste of Basin waters.
ii.

CBM Groundwater Pumping Violates the No-Injury Rule of Prior
Appropriation

Under the prior appropriation doctrine, it is axiomatic that a new
water user may not take water that belongs to an existing water rights
user―the “no injury” rule. 162 In his First Interim Report, the Special
Master concluded that the prior appropriation doctrine has evolved to
include hydrologically connected groundwater. 163 As evidence of this
evolution, he noted that both Wyoming and Montana have included
groundwater within their water rights permitting systems. 164 Yet when it
comes to CBM production, both States’ regulatory systems openly
violate the no-injury rule by failing to consider whether CBM wells
deplete water belonging to water rights users. 165
While the Wyoming State Engineer has concluded that CBM
groundwater pumping is a beneficial use requiring a permit, Wyoming
does not review the permit applications in advance for injury. Instead,
the permit is typically granted “as a matter of course,” 166 with a
condition requiring no injury. 167 Wyoming groundwater permits specify:

162

LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES, supra note 122, at § 5.15; 2-12 WATERS AND
WATER RIGHTS, supra note 122, at § 17.02 (“Interference with water rights by other appropriators or
would-be appropriators gives rise to statutory and common law protection for holders of senior water
rights. . . . This right of protection against interference with appropriative rights has long been
recognized as fundamental law by the courts and writers.”).
163
See supra notes 56-59 and related discussion.
164
See supra notes 56-59 and related discussion.
165
For a sampling of scholarship making this point, see, e.g., Murphy, supra note 82, at 408
(noting concerns about impacts to water rights as “aquifers are depleted”); Valorz, supra note 82, at
135-36 (concluding that Wyoming’s State Engineer is failing to ensure that existing water rights are
protected); Eric Waeckerlin, Case Note, The New Border War: CBM Development in the Powder
River Basin of Wyoming and Montana, 26 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 149, 156 (2005)
(observing that irrigators and other surface water rights users are at risk from CBM production).
166
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-931 (Westlaw 2011).
167
Form U.W.5, Application for Permit to Appropriate Ground Water 2 (2009), available at
seo.state.wy.us/PDF/UW5_0909.pdf.
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This application is approved subject to the condition that the proposed
use shall not interfere with any existing rights to ground water from
the same source of supply and is subject to regulation and correlation
with surface water rights, if the ground and surface waters are
interconnected. 168

Advance notice is not required before the permit issues, so little
opportunity exists for water rights users to raise issues of injury in
advance. 169 The burden thus shifts to the injured water rights user to
assert an injury after it has occurred. 170 The injured user may be facing
major water depletions that are harming her livelihood, yet she is asked
to bear the financial costs of proving that CBM production caused her
injury―no small task in the hyrdologically complex Powder River
Basin. For all practical purposes, Wyoming has relinquished its
responsibility to protect senior water rights users from CBM production
and has left those users to fend for themselves.
The picture in Montana is equally concerning. The Montana Water
Use Act generally requires applicants for new groundwater uses to show,
inter alia, that water is legally and physically available and that “the
water rights of a prior appropriator under an existing water right, a
certificate, a permit, or a state water reservation will not be adversely
affected.” 171 But CBM wells are exempted from the Water Use Act, and
the MBOGC, which has jurisdiction over CBM wells, does not apply the
Act’s review criteria. 172 Even in those limited situations when the
MDRNC reviews beneficial uses of CBM by-product water, the agency
has created a legal fiction that the “source” of the water right is the
above-ground pipeline in which the by-product water is stored. 173 Thus,
Montana does not review the initial CBM groundwater extraction for
injury to either surface or groundwater rights users.
168

Id.
This lack of notice was one basis of the litigation in William F. West Ranch, LLC v.
Tyrrell, 206 P.3d 722 (Wyo. 2009). See discussion supra notes 158-161 and accompanying text.
170
Establishing an injury does not guarantee that an adequate remedy will result. As noted
above in Part II, the damage to the water resource may appear long after the CBM well has been
capped and the producer has moved on.
171
MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-311(1)(a), (b) (Westlaw 2011).
172
See supra notes 138-139 and accompanying text.
173
Order on Scope of Issues for Hearing, Application Nos. 42B-30011045 and 42B-30014358
for Beneficial Water Use Permit by Fidelity Exploration 2–3 (Jan. 3, 2007), available at
www.dnrc.mt.gov/wrd/water_rts/hearing_info/significant_hearingdecisions/fidelity_orderhearingexaminer.pdf. One district court has held that this legal fiction is legally and factually
incorrect, and that MDNRC should review applications for use of CBM by-product water as
groundwater applications and also then analyze injury to users due to that groundwater withdrawal.
N. Plains Res. Council, Inc. v. Montana Dep’t of Natural Res. & Conservation, No. CDV-2007-425
(Mont. 1st Jud. Dist. Dec. 15, 2008) (on file with author).
169

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/gguelj/vol5/iss2/6

34

Mudd: Coalbed Methane Development

2012]

COALBED METHANE DEVELOPMENT

331

As is the case in Wyoming, injured water rights users in Montana
are also left to fend for themselves. At first blush, Montana does appear
to provide limited protection by statutorily requiring CBM producers to
“offer” water mitigation agreements to injured well owners within a
“circle of influence” (COI) area around a CBM well. 174 But the balance
of power seems greatly tilted toward the CBM producer to determine
both whether there is an injury and what mitigation is appropriate. And,
turning the no-injury rule on its head, the statute suggests that the CBM
producer ultimately gets to take the senior water user’s groundwater in
exchange for some unspecified form of “mitigation.” 175 This is
tantamount to permitting a CBM company to condemn a water right
without going through eminent domain procedures or paying just
compensation. Injured surface water users―those who would be
protected under the Compact―are left to their own devices since the
CBM laws fail to even consider them at all.
Scientists have questioned the “circle of influence” approach to
injury because it does not reflect the hydrologic reality of Basin-wide
CBM groundwater drawdowns. 176 In commenting on the proposed use of
COI mitigation in the Basin, one senior geologist observed the following:
[G]roundwater models indicate that the drawdown caused by CBM
development is regional in nature. In other words, the CBM
development causes drawdown that extends across the basin—the
entire Powder River Basin becomes one gigantic gas field. The
groundwater models indicate that the drawdown is tied collectively to
the entire development. However, damage to a water well, as defined
by the water well agreement, is tied to the well within the circle of
influence of a CBM well (or wells) . . . . There will be places in the

174

MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-11-175(3) (Westlaw 2011); see also WATER RESOURCES
DIVISION, MONTANA DNRC, MONTANA’S BASIN CLOSURES AND CONTROLLED GROUNDWATER
AREAS 23–24 (Dec. 2003), available at dnrc.mt.gov/wrd/water_rts/appro_info/basinclosecgw_areas.pdf (requiring similar mitigation within a controlled groundwater area in the Powder
River Basin).
175
MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-11-175(3) (Westlaw 2011).
176
For example, Wyoming geologist Walter Merschat was quoted in Powder River Breaks as
follows:
Merschat also dismissed the use of a “circle of influence” around a well to artificially limit
the area in which a well is believed to affect groundwater supply. “It is unfortunate that the
COI has been adopted to define the limits that CBM dewatering activities impact
groundwater,” he wrote. “Groundwater flows downhill through subsurface reservoirs and its
movement is based on rock fabric, not a circle on the surface. Therefore, the aerial extent of
CBM dewatering is more widespread and complex than a simple circle on a map.”
Experts Cite CBM Threats in Fortification Area, 35 POWDER RIVER BREAKS, July-Aug. 2007, at 3,
available at www.powderriverbasin.org/assets/Uploads/files/publications/2007/breaksjulyaug07.pdf.
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CBM developed portion of the Powder River Basin where there is no
operating CBM well within [the COI], yet where the groundwater
models predict a decline in the Fort Union water level of more than
several hundred feet. In other words, there may be no active CBM
well within [the COI] of an impacted water well; the impact is caused
by the collective CBM development. 177

It is difficult to imagine a scenario where Basin-wide aquifer
drawdowns of several hundred feet do not impact both surface and
groundwater users in the Tongue and Power River basins. This high
likelihood of injury makes the need for advance review of injury all the
greater.
In summary, the States have created an extraordinary exemption for
CBM development that undermines the very tenets of prior appropriation
law as we know it. They are permitting CBM wells without advance
review of groundwater-surface water connectivity, without advance
review of waste, and without advance review of injury to water rights
users. CBM producers in Wyoming and Montana may well be drawing
down surface water supplies belonging to both pre- and post-1950 water
rights holders in violation of the Compact. By identifying those CBM
regulations that offend the Compact, the U.S. Supreme Court and the
Special Master can provide clear guidance to the States’ and help set the
stage for a better CBM management regime―a regime that could serve
as a guide for other western states as well. The key scientific components
of that CBM management regime, which are a necessary part of any
remedy in the Montana v. Wyoming litigation, are described next.
C.

AN ADEQUATE REMEDY MUST INCLUDE DECISIONMAKING AND
MANAGEMENT BASED ON SOUND GROUNDWATER SCIENCE

In the final step toward Compact compliance, the U.S. Supreme
Court and the Special Master should identify the basic scientific
requirements necessary to ensure the States honor the Compact’s
equitable division of waters during their development of CBM. At this
point, it is tempting to consider the possibility that the States may,
through settlement talks, be able to resolve the scientific approaches they
wish to take. Nonetheless, we must remain mindful that it was the
parties’ inability to resolve their differences that resulted in the

177

Comments on Wyoming & Montana Final Environmental Impact Statement on the
development of Coal-Bed Methane at 7 (undated), submitted by John Bredehoeft, Ph.D. [hereinafter
Bredehoeft Final EIS Comments], available at www.powderriverbasin.org/assets/Uploads/files/
final/expertfeisjohnbredehoeft.pdf.
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proceeding being filed before the U.S. Supreme Court. 178 Moreover, the
economic incentives are skewed in such a way that the States may
forestall addressing CBM issues in favor of allowing the economic
benefits of CBM development to continue. Although the parties may
eventually be in a position to negotiate the finer points of a CBM
management program, the Special Master can provide an important
starting place for negotiations by stating the essential scientific
requirements that a CBM management program must contain for
purposes of Compact compliance. In so doing, the Special Master will
also be benefitting the other western states that share interstate CBM
basins as well.
Briefly, the essential scientific requirements for Compact
compliance should include:
Reliable surface-groundwater modeling and data collection that is
shared and stored in databases accessible to both parties;
A scientific threshold for determining when surface and groundwater
are considered “connected”;
Advance analysis of injury, using science-based data, before a CBM
well is permitted;
Consideration of cumulative impacts and longevity of impacts when
considering injury during CBM well permitting;
Mitigation that protects the quantity, quality, and timing of water use
to which water rights holders are entitled under the Compact; and
Ongoing monitoring and active management of waters impacted by
CBM groundwater pumping.

If these basic scientific requirements are stated as an essential
component of the remedy in Montana v. Wyoming, then the parties will
be responsible for resolving how to implement the requirements over the
long term. What follows is a brief rationale for why these scientific
requirements are necessary, as well as some possible directions that the
parties could take in their implementation.
Surface-Groundwater Modeling and Data Collection. Leshy
describes groundwater modeling as “an essential tool to manage
groundwater intelligently.” 179 Indeed, any fair and equitable remedy
must emanate from a body of accurate scientific models and data
concerning groundwater-surface water connectivity in the Basin,
beginning with the areas where CBM development is occurring most
heavily and moving into other areas of anticipated CBM groundwater
178
179

Brief in Support of Motion, supra note 15, at 2, 26–27.
Leshy, supra note 67, at 1479.
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use.
The National Research Council (NRC) recently concluded that to
meaningfully evaluate various management options for CBM
groundwater withdrawals, “data to determine the connectivity of
groundwater and surface water and groundwater modeling are
necessary.” 180 The NRC goes on to note that data gaps exist in the
Powder River Basin and that existing data is not compiled into common,
accessible databases. The NRC observes that this data is critical to
testing the results of groundwater modeling “to establish a level of
reliability that is suitable for making management decisions.” 181 Absent
field data, hydrogeologic models may yield inaccurate results that fail to
account for “complex water-rock interactions, differences in hydraulic
properties, or boundary conditions in CBM basins.” 182
The concept of groundwater modeling and data collection is not
new in compact administration. In a Final Settlement Stipulation among
Colorado, Nebraska, and Kansas, those states agreed to settle a dispute
under the Republican River Compact by identifying specific accounting
practices, reporting practices, data sharing, and groundwater modeling
protocols that would address groundwater depletions of surface water on
the Republican River. 183 Additionally, Lawrence MacDonnell, in writing
on the feasibility of greater surface-groundwater regulation in Wyoming,
notes several other successful examples of groundwater modeling in the
West—modeling that ultimately helps “promote the most effective use of
the available water supply.” 184 Colorado in particular has made strides by
designating key CBM study areas where it is determining whether CBM
groundwater pumping is depleting surface water supplies. 185
Further, although the Yellowstone River Compact does not address
federal or Indian reserved water rights, the Basin contains large
180

COALBED METHANE PRODUCED WATER, supra note 1, at 47.
Id. at 7, 49.
182
Id.
183
Final Settlement Stipulation, Kansas v. Nebraska (No. 126, Orig.) (Dec. 15, 2002)),
available at www.ksda.gov/includes/document_center/interstate_water_issues/RRC_Docs/
RR_Settlement_Stipulation176.pdf. It should be noted that Kansas has sued Nebraska for violating
this Stipulation based on the data revealed by the accounting reported under the groundwater
modeling since the parties entered into the Stipulation. See generally Kansas Motion for Leave to
File Petition, Petition, and Brief in Support (No. 126, Orig.) (May 3, 2010), available at
www.pierceatwood.com/files/9389_2010-0503_KansasMotionforLeavetoFilePetitionPetitionandBriefinSupport.pdf.
184
See MacDonnell, supra note 67, at 62 (citing examples from Colorado, Idaho,
Washington, and Arizona).
185
See Colorado Geological Survey, Water Depletion as a Result of Coalbed Methane
Production in Colorado, geosurvey.state.co.us/water/CBM%20Water%20Depletion/Pages/
CBMWaterDepletion.aspx (last visited Mar. 12, 2012).
181

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/gguelj/vol5/iss2/6

38

Mudd: Coalbed Methane Development

2012]

COALBED METHANE DEVELOPMENT

335

landholdings belonging to the federal government and the Crow Tribe
and Northern Cheyenne Tribe. 186 The Environmental Impact Statements
for CBM development on federal lands already demonstrate the federal
government’s use of groundwater modeling to assess impacts of CBM
development on federal lands. 187 Because CBM and water resources
cross through these jurisdictional boundaries, the federal government and
Tribes appear to be essential partners in this modeling and data gathering
endeavor.
Thresholds for Determining Connectivity. To properly analyze
impacts to Compact water rights users, it is important to quantitatively
establish the “extent to which CBM-producing formations hydraulically
connect to surface waters and major aquifers.” 188 The scientific
community generally recognizes the principle that all groundwater, at
some point, connects to surface water. 189 Thus, the States must identify
the point at which connectivity transitions from remote to significant
enough to measurably impact surface water rights.
Here, the parties have an example in the settlement reached among
Wyoming, Nebraska, and Colorado resolving a surface watergroundwater dispute under the North Platte Compact. 190 In that case, the
parties stipulated that “[a] hydrologically connected groundwater well is
one that is so located and constructed that if water were intentionally
withdrawn by the well continuously for 40 years, the cumulative stream
depletion would be greater than or equal to 28% of the total groundwater
withdrawn by the well.” 191 Colorado state law provides another
alternative. There, groundwater is presumed to be “tributary” to surface
water unless the applicant for groundwater use proves that the
withdrawal will not “within one hundred years of continuous withdrawal,
deplete the flow of a natural stream . . . at an annual rate greater than

186

See T.T. TABER & S.A. KINNEY, LAND USE AND OWNERSHIP, POWDER RIVER BASIN, U.S.
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY PROFESSIONAL PAPER 1625-A, at figs. PM-2 and PM-3 (1999), available at
pubs.usgs.gov/pp/p1625a/Chapters/PM.pdf (assessing tertiary coal beds and zones by surface and
underlying ownership).
187
See, for example, the Wyoming and Montana EIS documents for the Powder River Basin,
supra notes 79-80.
188
COALBED METHANE PRODUCED WATER, supra note 1, at 48.
189
E.g., THOMAS C. WINTER ET AL., U.S. DEPT. OF INTERIOR, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY,
GROUND WATER AND SURFACE WATER: A SINGLE RESOURCE 1 (1998), available at
pubs.usgs.gov/circ/circ1139/pdf/circ1139.pdf; MacDonnell, supra note 67, at 62.
190
E.g., Nebraska v. Wyoming, 534 U.S. 40 (2001) (settling a dispute involving groundwater
depletions under the North Platte Compact) (discussed in MacDonnell, supra note 67, at 58–60).
191
Proposed Joint Settlement at 201, Nebraska v. Wyoming, 534 U.S. 40 (No. 108, Orig.),
available at dnr.ne.gov/NorthPlatte/Settlement/108FinalReport.pdf (discussed in MacDonnell, supra
note 67, at 58–60).
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one-tenth of one percent of the annual rate of withdrawal.” 192
Advance Analysis of Injury. Consistent with prior appropriation
principles, a CBM developer must provide an advance analysis of injury
to water rights users before any CBM well permit is issued. Wyoming’s
lack of advance analysis of harm under its CBM groundwater permits
provides an inadequate remedy because the ensuing harm may be longterm or irreversible once it occurs. 193 Likewise, “circle of influence”
approaches such as those taken by Montana are inadequate because they
do not comport with groundwater science and fail to address surface
water injuries. 194 Thus, an entirely new approach to injury analysis is
warranted—one that uses groundwater modeling and data in advance to
determine the extent of injury to existing water rights holders under the
Compact.
Outside of CBM water use, Montana already inquires into the
harm posed by other groundwater permit applicants and, further still,
requires more extensive groundwater modeling (hyrdogeologic
assessments) for groundwater permit applications in its closed, or overappropriated, basins. 195 And while not perfect models, the regulatory
approaches taken by the Canadian provinces of Alberta and British
Columbia also demonstrate that it is possible to ask CBM developers in
advance for water quality and water quantity data that is then used in
determining the impacts posed by the CBM groundwater withdrawals. 196
To the extent that a State lacks the necessary data to determine
injury to other water users, then the path of the Hawaii Supreme Court,
which has imposed the precautionary principle during water permitting,
provides an appropriate analog. When Hawaii’s state water commission
lacked sufficient evidence to determine whether water rights applicants
192

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-90-103(10.5) (Westlaw 2011). A recent Colorado decision
has now held that CBM groundwater withdrawals are beneficial uses subject to this requirement. See
Vance v. Wolfe, 205 P.3d 1165, 1171 (Colo. 2009).
193
See discussion supra Parts II and III.B.
194
See discussion supra Part III.B.
195
MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-311 and -360 to -363 (Westlaw 2011).
196
ALBERTA ENVIRONMENT, GUIDELINES FOR GROUNDWATER DIVERSION FOR COALBED
METHANE/NATURAL GAS IN COAL DEVELOPMENT 5–6 (Apr. 2004), available at
environment.gov.ab.ca/info/library/7834.pdf [hereinafter ALBERTA GUIDELINES]; BRITISH
COLUMBIA, CODE OF PRACTICE FOR THE DISCHARGE OF PRODUCED WATER FROM COALBED GAS
OPERATIONS, B.C. Reg. 156/2005, § 11 (2005), available at www.bclaws.ca/EPLibraries/
bclaws_new/document/ID/freeside/17_156_2005. Both models are discussed in Allan Ingelson et al.,
CBM Produced Water―The Emerging Canadian Regulatory Framework, 10 U. DENV. WATER L.
REV. 23, 31–32, 37–38 (2006). These models are imperfect because, among other issues, both focus
mostly on water quality and groundwater impacts and underemphasize the impacts on water quantity
and hydrologically connected surface waters. Further, neither model assures protection of existing
water uses. Nonetheless, the proactive review built into both models demonstrates the feasibility of
advance review of injury.
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could use water without causing public harm, the Hawaii Supreme Court
held that it was appropriate for the commission to order the applicants to
contribute to the costs of stream studies and monitoring before
determining whether the permit criteria were satisfied:
Where scientific evidence is preliminary and not yet conclusive . . . it
is prudent to adopt “precautionary principles” in protecting the
resource. That is, where there are present or potential threats of serious
damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be a basis for
postponing effective measures to prevent environmental
degradation . . . . In addition, where uncertainty exists, a trustee’s duty
to protect the resource mitigates in favor of choosing presumptions
that also protect the resource.
As with any general principle, its meaning must vary according to the
situation and can only develop over time. In this case, we believe the
Commission describes the principle in its quintessential form: at
minimum, the absence of firm scientific proof should not tie the
Commission’s hands in adopting reasonable measures designed to
197
further the public interest.

Because of the potential for long-term and irreversible harm from
CBM groundwater pumping, it similarly makes sense to employ the
precautionary principle and impose study requirements on CBM well
applicants to ensure that no actual injury occurs to water rights users
under the Compact.
Determining Cumulative Impacts and Longevity of Impacts. Injury
should not be analyzed on a well-by-well basis, but rather with an eye
toward the cumulative impacts of multiple CBM wells pumping across a
groundwater source. In his CBM Primer, Gary Bryner notes that “[t]he
minimum threshold for a viable [CBM] project . . . depends on a variety
of factors, but one estimate is that a new, remote basin requires at least
400 wells or 200 billion cubic feet of production to be viable.” 198 Basin
geologist Joe Bredehoeft, citing to existing Basin groundwater models,
has observed that the cumulative effect of these multiple wells “causes
drawdown that extends across the basin—the entire Powder River Basin
becomes one gigantic gas field” that can draw down an aquifer by as
much as 100 feet. 199 Thus, the States should not artificially limit their
analysis to individual CBM wells when reviewing for injury to water
rights users under the Compact. Here too, the Province of Alberta
197

In re Water Use Permit Applications (Waiahole), 9 P.3d 409, 426-27, 495-96 (Haw. 2000).
CBM PRIMER, supra note 1, at 7.
199
Bredehoeft Final EIS Comments, supra note 177, at 7.
198
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provides an example of a jurisdiction that considers cumulative impacts
as part of the initial CBM permitting process. 200
Further, as discussed in Part II above, the true impact of the CBM
wells must be viewed over the long term, since the wells themselves
have a very short life span. 201 The rates of aquifer recharge will be
significantly slower than the rates of CBM groundwater
pumping―extending into the hundreds of years. Impacts will most likely
continue long after a CBM well is abandoned, 202 and that long-term harm
must be factored into the States’ review of injury.
Suitability Thresholds for Mitigation. The reality is that CBM
development will continue into the foreseeable future because of its
significance to national energy production and because of the economic
benefits that return back to the States. 203 This means that, to the extent
CBM development is depleting Basin waters, the States will have to find
new and creative ways to ensure water delivery to Compact water users
while also allowing CBM development to occur. The creative use of
storage, recharge, substitution and other types of replacement water
mitigation is likely necessary to achieve Compact compliance. Indeed,
because much of the CBM water in the Basin is of higher quality, it may
serve useful in mitigation, 204 provided that senior water rights holders do
not suffer injury during the mitigation process. The States’ present
mitigation systems, discussed in Part III.B above, will not adequately
protect Compact water users because they leave mitigation to the
discretion of the CBM company. True mitigation must include questions
not only of replacement quantity but also of replacement quality, 205 as
200

ALBERTA GUIDELINES, supra note 162, at 8.
See discussion supra Part II; see also CBM PRIMER, supra note 1, at 7 (noting that wells
typically produce gas for seven to ten years, and “basins may be relatively quickly pumped and then
abandoned”).
202
CBM PRIMER, supra note 1, at 7; see also discussion supra Part II.
203
See, e.g., Rod De Bruin, Wyoming Oil and Gas, WYOMING STATE GEOLOGICAL SURVEY,
www.wsgs.uwyo.edu/AboutWSGS/oil_and_gas.aspx (last visited Mar. 12, 2012) (“In fiscal year
2006, oil and gas production contributed more than $2.2 billion to state and local governments in
severance and property taxes, federal and state royalties, conservation mill levy, and sales and use
taxes.”); see also DE BRUIN ET AL., supra note 76, at 20–21 (generally outlining the economic
benefits to government and private businesses and landowners); CBM PRIMER, supra note 1, at 1
(noting CBM as a central resource to the security of our national energy supply).
204
CBM PRIMER, supra note 1, at 13 fig.9.
205
Under prior appropriation, a water right included not only quantity, but also quality
sufficient to support the water use. City of Helena v. Rogan, 26 Mont. 452, 470, 68 P. 798, 800
(1902) (recognizing that a water rights holder has the right to have water of “such quality as will
meet his needs as protected by his water right”); see also Sussex Land & Live Stock Co. v. Midwest
Refining Co., 294 F. 597, 603 (1923) (under the Wyoming Constitution, a water right includes “the
quality as well as the quantity” (quoting Arizona Copper Co. v. Gillespie, 230 U.S. 46, 57 (1913)).
While this Article has necessarily focused on quantity due to the nature of the claims in Montana v.
201
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well as the timeliness and convenience of water delivery. These are
questions that the States, rather than CBM developers, should resolve in
advance of permitting a CBM well, so that the water users protected by
the Compact are not left in a worse position than they were in prior to
approval of a CBM well.
Monitoring and Active Water Area Management. Data-gathering for
CBM well analysis should extend beyond the permitting stage to ongoing
monitoring of the wells in the field. Ongoing monitoring ensures the
injury does not grow beyond that predicted during the initial review of
the CBM well application. This ongoing data gathering also further fills
the Basin’s data gaps, continuing to improve the accuracy of the
groundwater modeling on which the parties will rely. Here, Basin
geologist John Bredehoeft recommends that:
There should be a monitoring program designed to document the
impact of CBM production on the deep aquifers of the Powder River
Basin. If we are to see the total impact of the development (drawdown
and recovery) the monitoring needs to be sustained into the later part
of the 21st Century—at least to the year 2060. There will be pressure
to discontinue the monitoring once the CBM wells are plugged and
abandoned and the CBM operators are gone. 206

Bredehoeft goes on to suggest that the monitoring include:
sufficient monitoring wells appropriately located to obtain an accurate
picture of drawdown in the Basin; a select number of “continuous
monitoring” stations that generate “digital data collected at 15-minute
intervals”; and a records database “that is kept up to date and accessible
on the Internet.” 207
This monitoring is best achieved within the context of actively
managed water areas that geographically encompass the places that CBM
groundwater withdrawals are impacting Compact rights. Both States
currently have statutes that could be adapted for such use. In Wyoming,
the State has authority to create “control areas” when there is insufficient
water to meet the needs of appropriators, when conflicts in use are
occurring, or when there is waste of water. 208 Within these areas, wells
are closely monitored for harm to other users, withdrawals may be
curtailed or reduced, rotations in use may be imposed, and wells may be
Wyoming, the remedy would be wholly inadequate if CBM developers could mitigate harm by
supplying substitute waters of inferior quality that could not support the irrigation, livestock, and
domestic uses of the Basin.
206
Bredehoeft Final EIS Comments, supra note 177, at 9.
207
Id. at 10.
208
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-912 (Westlaw 2011).
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spaced to reduce harm. 209 A similar approach may be taken in areas of
demonstrated groundwater-surface water connectivity when unified
administration of rights by priority becomes important. 210
In Montana, “controlled ground water areas” may be created for
similar reasons, and the State possesses comparable authority to close or
restrict withdrawals, regulate well spacing, and require mitigation in the
event of harm to users. 211 In Montana’s closed basins, where water
supply is over-appropriated, the State requires that proposed groundwater
withdrawals conduct a hydrogeologic assessment that analyzes surface
water impacts. 212 Where a “net depletion of surface water” will occur
and cause an adverse impact to an appropriator, the law imposes a
mitigation requirement that precludes new water uses unless and until
suitable replacement waters can be found. 213 The mitigation may be
through aquifer recharge or replacement surface or groundwaters via the
reallocation of existing water rights. 214
At the moment, neither State appears to be using these statutory
mechanisms to squarely tackle the issue of CBM groundwater depletion
of senior surface water rights. By articulating a starting place for
integrated surface and groundwater management in the Basin, 215 and
informing it with the scientific measures discussed above, the Special
Master can set Wyoming and Montana on a course that reduces the
chances of further interstate disputes in the Basin and provides a
meaningful, prospective remedy under the Compact.
V.

CONCLUSION

Montana v. Wyoming offers a rich and rare opportunity to transform
the relationship between CBM and prior appropriation. The Special
Master has concluded that hydrologically connected groundwaters fall
within the scope of the Yellowstone River Compact, and the U.S.
209

Id. § 41-3-915.
Id. § 41-3-916.
211
MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-506 (Westlaw 2011). Montana currently has such an area
designated in part of the Powder River Basin, but controls are limited to remedying harm to
groundwater well owners within a circle of influence around a CBM well—essentially paralleling
the statutory remedy critiqued in Part III.B, supra. These controls are inadequate to address the full
spectrum of senior rights requiring protection.
212
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 85-2-360, -361 (Westlaw 2011).
213
Id.
214
Id. § 85-2-362.
215
“Integrated” suggests an approach where surface and groundwaters are managed as one
resource to ensure that water is used according to priority. This does not necessarily mean that the
States will jointly co-manage those waters, although each State will need to manage its water
resources under the Compact according to certain mutually agreed upon practices and rules.
210
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Supreme Court has held that the laws of prior appropriation imbue the
parties’ expectations under the Compact. Based on these preliminary
rulings, the country’s highest court is poised to illuminate the water law
rules applicable to CBM groundwater withdrawals and to fashion a
remedy that better hews to those rules. Important to that remedy will be
the inclusion of all Compact water rights, a candid critique of the States’
current CBM regulations, and a call for certain basic steps that assure
sound management practices of the surface and groundwaters affected by
CBM production. With states throughout the West struggling with these
very same issues, and seemingly unable to reach solutions on their own,
the opportunity to improve CBM regulation starts but does not end with
the Powder River Basin.
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